Pay for Play: The Compensated Leisure Flaw of Contract Damages by Engler, Mitchell L.
Yeshiva University, Cardozo School of Law 
LARC @ Cardozo Law 
Articles Faculty 
2015 
Pay for Play: The Compensated Leisure Flaw of Contract 
Damages 
Mitchell L. Engler 
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, engler@yu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/faculty-articles 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Mitchell L. Engler, Pay for Play: The Compensated Leisure Flaw of Contract Damages, 22 George Mason 
Law Review 297 (2015). 
Available at: https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/faculty-articles/329 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty at LARC @ Cardozo Law. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of LARC @ Cardozo Law. For more information, 
please contact christine.george@yu.edu, ingrid.mattson@yu.edu. 
2015] 297 
PAY FOR PLAY: THE COMPENSATED LEISURE FLAW 
OF CONTRACT DAMAGES 
Mitchell L. Engler• 
INTRODUCTION 
Contract damage law strives to provide the injured party the benefit of 
the bargain. 1 This rule caps the damages at the amount needed to place the 
injured party in as good a position as if the contract had been fulfilled by 
both parties.2 By limiting damages to the injured party's net benefit under 
the contract, contract law allows terminating parties to minimize losses 
from deals gone awry, but not at the expense of the other side. This protects 
both parties against a postsigning realization by either one that the contract 
no longer makes sense. 3 For these reasons, the benefit of the bargain norm 
provides both a fair and efficient result.4 
To illustrate, consider a $20,000 sales contract for a boat. Both parties 
anticipate benefits at the signing, but the buyer loses his job before the de­
livery date.5 The buyer can cancel without liability for the entire $20,000 
price. If the seller resells the boat for $19,000, the buyer generally owes 
only $1,000.6 The damages rise under the "lost volume" seller doctrine if 
'Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. I would like to thank 
Susan Heyman and Alex Stein for their helpful comments and suggestions, and Greg Brown for his 
research assistance and comments. Special thanks to Chloe Orlando for her tireless contributions, in­
cluding insightful feedback on multiple drafts in addition to research assistance. 
1 See, e.g., U.C.C. § l-305(a) (2012) ("The remedies provided by [the Uniform Commercial 
Code] must be liberally administered to the end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a posi­
tion as if the other party had fully performed . .. " (first alteration in original)); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 347 cmt. a (1981) ("Contract damages are ordinarily based on the injured 
party's expectation interest and are intended to give him the benefit of his bargain by awarding him a 
sum of money that will, to the extent possible, put him in as good a position as he would have been in 
had the contract been performed.") 
2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 347 cmt. a (1981).
3 Such postsigning realization could stem from either a material change in a relevant contract
factor or perhaps just a more accurate assessment of the anticipated benefits or costs of the contract. In 
either event, both sides are protected against being unduly locked into a deal they no longer desire. At 
the same time, both sides remain protected if the other side reaches such a postsigning realization. 
4 See discussion infra Part I.A. I, for more on "efficient breach."
5 Cf Neri v. Retail Marine Corp., 285 N.E.2d 311,312 (N.Y. 1972) (discussing buyer's cancella­
tion of boat purchase due to medical reasons). 
6 This is calculated as the difference between the $20,000 contract price and the $19,000 resale 
price. See U.C.C. § 2-706(1) (2012) ("[T]he seller may resell the goods .. .. Where the resale is made in 
good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner the seller may recover the difference between the 
resale price and the contract price .... "). 
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the seller could have made both sales at a profit absent the breach.7 For in­
stance, the buyer would owe $2,000 if the seller could have acquired anoth­
er similar boat for $18,000. 8 In either case, the damages place the seller 
only in as good a position as if the buyer had not breached9 and do not aim 
to penalize the buyer for breaking the deal. ID 
Turning from goods to services exposes, however, a deeply flawed in­
consistency in the law. Assume now that married homeowners enter into 
separate $20,000 contracts with a mason and carpenter to add a brick fa�ade 
and deck to their home. The owners choose the contractors due to their rep­
utations for doing all the high quality work themselves. To isolate the ser­
vices problem, further assume that the owners separately contracted with an 
outside supplier for the brick and wood materials. 11 After the husband loses 
his job, the homeowners cancel the contract. 
How much would the owners owe the mason and carpenter on the 
breach? In stark contrast to the boat buyer above, 12 they likely would owe 
each the full $20,000 as the laborers do not save any tangible costs from the 
breach. 13 But this provides the laborers much better than the benefit of the 
bargain as they no longer have to do any of the work. In other words, they 
receive full compensation and their newly liberated leisure time. Given the 
value of free leisure time, this result is too generous to the laborers. This 
7 See Neri, 285 N:E.2d at 314; U.C.C. § 2-708(2) (2012); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 34 7 cmt. f ( I 981 ). 
8 Assume, for instance, that the seller purchased the first boat also for $18,000. Absent the
breach, the seller would have made one $1,000 profit from the sale to the second buyer ($19,000 
$18,000) and one $2,000 profit from the sale to the first buyer ($20,000 - $18,000). With the breach, the 
seller made just the $1,000 profit on the actual sale. See U.C.C. § 2-708(2) (2012) ("If the measure of 
damages provided in subsection (I) is inadequate to put the seller in as good a position as performance 
would have done then the measure of damages is the profit (including reasonable overhead) which the 
seller would have made from full performance by the buyer .... "). See Neri, 285 N.E.2d at 313-15, for 
an application of this doctrine. 
9 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 347 cmt. a (1981).
IO See id. § 347 cmt. e.
11 More typically, the contracts with the mason and carpenter would involve both the labor and the
materials. Since the labor flaw remains the same even in such mixed contract, the textual illustration 
separates it out for ease of exposition. The discussion of the Restatement's LVSP illustration provides 
another example considering a mixed goods and services case. See infra Part I.A. I. 
12 The contracts for the brick and wood materials, which also involve goods, are treated similar to
the earlier boat scenario. See U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (2012) ('"Goods' means all things (including specially 
manufactured goods) which are movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale other than 
the money in which the price is to be paid, investment securities (Article 8) and things in action."). 13 In contrast, the boat seller retained the resale value of the (tangible) boat. Similar mitigation
principles might reduce a laborer's recovery by newly available wages in certain cases. But mitigation 
has no impact where new compensation is not available. In addition, as discussed below in the text, 
mitigation typically does not apply even to newly available wages for these part-time contracting jobs. 
See infra note 16 and Part J.B. I. 
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"compensated leisure" result likewise is unduly harsh for the owners, who 
bear more loss than necessary to make the laborers whole. 14 
Importantly, the laborers may receive this excess compensation even if 
they perform new work postbreach. This outcome depends upon the charac­
teristics of the laborer. While income from new work often reduces a full­
time employee's damages, 15 this mitigation offset does not impact part-time 
contractors who can handle multiple projects at the same time. 16 Like the 
lost volume boat seller above, such excess labor capacity supports some 
extra damages. But the current application of the "lost volume" doctrine in 
the service context overcompensates laborers by disregarding the saved 
nontangible costs of work. In sum, a lost volume service provider ("LVSP") 
receives full compensation without having to work on the breached contract 
and regardless of new work availability. 
Consider the proper correction for the identified flaw. In theory, the 
contract price should be reduced by the laborer's lowest acceptable price 
for the job: his "reservation price." 17 With such reduction, the laborer would 
receive his real benefit from the deal, limited to only the extra or "surplus" 
value above his personalized cost of performance. If the mason would have 
taken the job for any price above $18,000, he should receive only his 
$2,000 surplus value. 18 This captures his true benefit since a contract at 
$18,000 ( or less) would fail to provide him any benefit at all. 19 This surplus 
value approach would treat service contracts more consistently with goods 
contracts, thereby improving the law's coherence, fairness, and efficiency. 
Difficulty in calculating actual reservation prices hampers an exact ad­
justment. This, in tum, might partially explain the current flaw.20 This Arti-
14 With full knowledge of the law, the owners on this "service only" contract have an incentive to
either maintain the contracts (since they owe the full price anyway) or negotiate a buyout at a lesser 
price. As noted above, though, this introductory example isolated the service element for ease of exposi­
tion, with the more typical contract involving both services and materials. And in that more typical case, 
even with full knowledge of the law, the homeowners might be better off cancelling the contract since 
the damage amount would be less than the contract price due to a reduction for the saved material costs. 
See infra Part I.A, for such an example and a more detailed discussion of possible resolutions. 
15 This mitigation may not fully eliminate the overcompensation effect for full-time employees
due to reasons discussed below. See infra Part II, for a fuller discussion of mitigation. 
16 See infra Part LB, for a fuller discussion of the mitigation exclusion and relevant authority.
17 David W. Barnes, The Meaning of Value in Contract Damages and Contract Theory, 46 AM. U.
L. REV. I, 16-17 (1996).
18 $20,000 less his $ I 8,000 reservation price equals $2,000.
19 A benefit thus occurred only as the negotiated price rose above $18,000, with the benefit then
increasing dollar for dollar as the negotiated price moved from $18,000 to $20,000. Another way of 
saying this is that the mason placed an $18,000 price tag on having to do the work, which is now saved 
by the breach. 
ZO Part of the problem is the subtlety of understanding the defect in the first place. See, for exam­
ple, infra note 50, addressing the intriguing link to the current firestorm over the value of a law degree, 
where analysts typically make the same error of neglecting the cost of sacrificing leisure for work. 
Hence one goal of this Article is to make the shortcoming more prominent. 
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cle presents two feasible ways to approximate reservation prices for L VSPs, 
either of which would vastly improve the law. Finally, given serious imper­
fections in application of the possible mitigation offset for full-time em­
ployees, the Article suggests comparable improvements for these workers 
as well. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I more fully develops the prob­
lematic lack of a leisure adjustment for L VSPs. Under the labor/leisure 
tradeoff principle, workers must sacrifice valuable leisure time to receive 
payment for services. But legal analysts repeatedly ignore this economic 
principle by providing L VSPs full contract damages. This Part then shows 
how diminishing marginal utility principles increase the defect when 
LVSPs undertake substitute work.21 
Part II turns to full-time employees. Damage mitigation applies in this 
context only for either rejected "comparable" work or substitute work actu­
ally performed. Thus, the compensated leisure defect persists for full-time 
employees who reject "noncomparable" work after discharge. Such em­
ployees also end up with fully compensated leisure time. 
Part III then demonstrates several achievable ways to reduce the com­
pensated leisure problem. As noted above, estimation of the reservation 
price provides the key. 22 Recognizing the uncertain nature of the contrac­
tor's LVSP claim, the first approach simply would require a more refined 
likelihood determination of L VSP status. The L VSP's contract price recov­
ery percentage would increase along with the relative strength of such 
LVSP likelihood finding.23 A similar sliding scale approach could be im­
plemented for full-time employees, albeit now based on the degree of the 
substitute work's comparability.24 Finally, labor elasticity studies provide
another way to estimate reservation prices for LVSPs as these studies cali­
brate how wage changes impact hourly work choices. 
I. COMPENSATED LEISURE FLAW FOR LOST VOLUME SERVICE
PROVIDERS
This Part more fully explains the "compensated leisure" flaw in con­
tract damage law. Contract damage law often grants a discharged laborer 
the full contract price despite the worker's relief from any future perfor­
mance. Such laborer receives an unjustified windfall: full monetary com-
21 See discussion infra Part 1.8.2.
22 Once the reservation price is estimated, the surplus value can be easily determined by subtract­
ing the estimated reservation price from the contract price. Barnes, supra note 17, at 16. 
23 This follows from an expected correlation between a lower reservation price and a greater
confidence in the L VSP finding. This approach also neatly hedges against erroneous determinations 
regarding LVSP status. See infra Part III.A.I. 
24 The contract recovery percentage proposed would decrease inversely related to the new job's
degree of comparability since higher job comparability indicates a lower surplus value. 
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pensation plus the newly liberated leisure time. The courts and legal com­
mentary have failed to either recognize or fully appreciate the significance 
of this compensated leisure problem.25 
This Part focuses on L VSPs capable of handling multiple projects.26 
After Section A presents general foundation arguments, Section B demon­
strates that L VSPs are particularly problematic because L VSP status ne­
gates mitigation for subsequent eamings.27 Diminishing marginal utility 
principles accentuate this windfall when LVSPs obtain new earnings.28 Sec­
tion C further demonstrates anomalous results when L VSPs subcontract out 
the work in question. This section also highlights how the L VSP status re-
25 For example, a leading treatise on damages does not directly address the leisure windfall point.
See DAN 8. DoBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES§ 12.25, at 924-25 (1973). As discussed in 
greater detail below, while a few prior commentators have recognized the liberated leisure problem, 
even they did not fully express (or perhaps appreciate) the true extent of the problem. See, e.g., Jeffrey 
L. Harrison, Wrong/it/ Discharge: Toward a More Efficient Remedy, 56 IND. L.J. 207, 207-10 (1981);
Michael B. Kelly, Living Without the Avoidable Consequences Doctrine in Contract Remedies, 33 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 175, 206-07 (1996); David S. Evans, An Economic Approach to the Mitigation of Dam­
ages in Age Discrimination Cases 2-4 (Nat') Econ. Research Assocs., Inc., Working Paper No. 17, 
1992). Such prior commentary unfortunately focused on full-time employees, who are less prone to 
compensated leisure than independent contractors since mitigation principles generally apply to em­
ployees. But this Article hones in on situations where mitigation is not applicable, thereby forcing a 
head-on consideration of the problem (without mitigation as a potential saving grace). The problem's 
prior consideration in the weaker full-time employee context might explain why the point has not yet 
taken hold. The initial goal of this Part, then, is to facilitate a more prominent understanding of this 
subtle issue. Such broader understanding might then open the pathway for a more appropriate response 
in the Jaw. See infra Part ill. 
26 Note that this Article adopts a more specific LVSP phrase in place of the often-used, more
general "lost volume seller" phrase since "lost volume sellers" can include sellers of goods or services, 
and only sellers of services implicate the compensated leisure problem. Part II will consider the com­
pensated leisure problem for full-time employees and other laborers lacking a LVSP's multiple job 
capacity. 
27 Unlike full-time employees, LVSPs are not subject to mitigation offsets for subsequent wages
since L VSPs can handle both the breached contract and the subsequent work. More technically, the 
mitigation offset for non-LVSPs applies to either (I) any work actually taken on; or (2) comparable 
work declined ( or somewhat related, the failure to undertake reasonable efforts to find comparable 
work). Mitigation principles arguably minimize the leisure windfall for full-time employees since dam­
ages are reduced to the extent of the above compensation factors ( wages for any work actually per­
formed or any comparable available work not taken by the employee during the contract period). While 
full-time employees can argue LVSP status for the new work to avoid mitigation, successful LVSP 
assertions are the exception rather than the general rule for those workers. In contrast, L VSP status is the 
general rule, not the exception, for the classic part-time independent contractor. See, e.g., Melvin Aron 
Eisenberg, The Responsive Model of Contract Law, 36 STAN. L. REV. I 107, 1147-50 (1984) (critiquing
current law for its general assumption that contractors could handle all the work). 
28 Current law's full compensation without a leisure time reduction provides a particularly poor
result for L VSPs since (I) the value of leisure time typically increases as additional work volume is 
undertaken due to the diminishing marginal utility ofleisure; and (2) the value of the monetary compen­
sation typically decreases as more projects are undertaken due to the diminishing marginal utility of 
money. See infra Part l.8.2. 
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futes two other possible offsets to the leisure windfall: (1) lost nontangible 
benefits from working; and (2) time spent looking for new work after the 
breach.29 
A. General Argument for Leisure Time Reduction
Two well-accepted concepts-the contract benefit of the bargain norm 
and the labor/leisure tradeoff principle30-facilitate exposition and quantifi­
cation of the compensated leisure flaw.31 To simplify explanation of the 
compensated leisure flaw, this Section assumes that new replacement work 
is unavailable after the breach. 32 
1. Benefit of the Bargain and the Labor/Leisure Tradeoff
Contract damages "are intended to give [the injured party] the benefit 
of his bargain by awarding him a sum of money that will, to the extent pos­
sible, put him in as good a position as he would have been in had the con­
tract been performed."33 In other words, contract damages aim to provide 
"the loss in the value to him of the other party's performance .... "34 
This benefit of the bargain approach reflects both fairness and effi­
ciency concerns. 35 From a fairness perspective, the norm captures the com­
pensatory nature of contract law, devoid of any punitive condemnation of 
the terminating party. 36 This benchmark also furthers efficiency as it per­
mits, and even encourages, a party to breach where its benefit from breach 
29 The latter point relates to mitigation. See supra note 27. Part II discusses why the possible
mitigation and nontangible benefit offsets are debatable even in the full-time employment context. 
However, the L VSP context better exposes the core problem by avoiding the need to even engage in 
those debates given their facial irrelevance in the L VSP context. 
30 This economic principle instructs that laborers must sacrifice valuable leisure time for compen­
sation. 
31 As will be shown, the proper reduction equals the surplus value: the excess of the contract price
over the minimum price the contractor would have been willing to accept for the work. 
32 Part I.B then demonstrates why these foundational arguments retain force even in the presence
of newly available work. 
33 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 347 cmt. a (1981).
34 Id. § 347(a).
35 The fairness aspect relates to distributional issues ( e.g., the sharing of resources between the
nonbreaching party and the breaching party), while efficiency focuses on increasing the overall re­
sources or welfare. To use a popular metaphor, efficiency focuses on increasing the size of the pie, 
whereas fairness focuses on the sharing of the pie between the participants. 
36 See, e.g., Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897)
("The duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do 
not keep it,-and nothing else."). 
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exceeds the other side's loss from the contract termination.37 These so­
called "efficient breaches" increase the parties' collective well-being given 
the excess net benefit from termination. 38 
In total, the benefit of the bargain benchmark best achieves these joint 
fairness and efficiency goals. Contract damages strive to be just high 
enough to leave the nonbreaching party indifferent to the breach, while lim­
ited enough to incentivize the breach through the breaching party's reten­
tion of the net benefit from termination. 39 Damages in excess of this norm 
can deter welfare gains from efficient breaches40 and unduly punish (re­
ward) the breaching (nonbreaching) party. For this reason, contract law 
generally aims to prevent damages above the nonbreaching party's real 
benefit.41 
With these principles in mind, now consider the L VSP illustration in 
the Restatement of Contracts.42 While the real-world universe of LVSPs is 
quite broad,43 the Restatement's basic example neatly illustrates the essen­
tial flaw: 
37 Fred S. McChesney, Tortious Interference with Contract Versus "Efficient" Breach: Theory
and Empirical Evidence, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 134-35 (1999). 
38 The net benefit equals the excess of the breaching party's gain over the nonbreaching party's
loss from the contract termination. 39 Some argue that the beneficial breach would occur even if the law provided for a (much) higher
recovery on breach since the nonbreaching party would then have an incentive to agree to a (somewhat) 
lower amount on a negotiated breach. Mitchell L. Engler & Susan B. Heyman, The Missing Elements of 
Contract Damages, 84 TEMP. L. REV. 119, 136-38 & n.85, 144 (2011). Under this view, the efficient 
breach would still occur, but the nonbreaching party would then be able to receive part of the additional 
value. In addition to raising issues as to whether the nonbreaching party is properly entitled to such a 
share, this position relies on a successful renegotiation before the occurrence of the breach. Transaction 
costs and other related factors might hamper such renegotiation however. See id. at 144, for a more 
detailed discussion. 40 See Patton v. Mid-Continent Sys., Inc., 841 F.2d 742, 750 (7th Cir. 1988), for a court decision
wanting to avoid such deterrent effect. See also J. Yanan & Assocs., Inc. v. Integrity Ins. Co., 771 F.2d 
I 025, I 034 (7th Cir. I 985). 41 For these reasons, contract law will not enforce an excessive liquidated damage clause despite
the explicit agreement of the parties. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 356(1) (1981) 
("Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement but only at an amount that is 
reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual loss caused by the breach and the difficulties of proof 
of loss. A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is unenforceable on grounds of public 
policy as a penalty."). 42 Id. § 347 cmt. f, illus. 16.43 In addition to the Restatement's parking lot paver illustration and the mason from the Introduc­
tion's homeowner scenario, the universe of potential LVSPs includes (1) builders (see Edwin W. Patter­
son, Builder's Measure of Recovery for Breach of Contract, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 1286, 1306 (1931)); 
(2) advertising spokesmen (see Lone Star Ford, Inc. v. McCormick, 838 S.W.2d 734, 740 (Tex. App.
1992)); (3) pension consultants (see Donald Rubin, Inc. v. Schwartz, 594 N.Y.S.2d 193, 194-95 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1993)); (4) doctors (see Gianetti v. Norwalk Hosp., 43 A.3d 567, 574, 576 (Conn. 2012));
(5) product endorsement contracts by athletes (see, e.g., In re Worldcom, Inc., 361 B.R. 675, 686 n.10
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) (involving Michael Jordan) ("On one hand, the 'lost volume seller' exception
does not appear to be available to a product endorser because of the understandable concern over di! u-
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A contractor agrees to pave an owner's parking lot for $10,000.44 The paver sues for damag­
es after the owner repudiates the contract without justification. To prevent a better result than 
the bargain itself, the paver's entitlement to the $10,000 price is reduced by any saved mone­
tary costs such as unused asphalt materials. 45 
Notably absent from the Restatement's standard formula is any reduc­
tion for the paver's saved work effort.46 Contrary to fairness and efficiency
tion through overexposure. However, if an endorser has not approached what would be his or her en­
dorsement limit, prior to dilution, it would seem that the continuous effort then to obtain more endorse­
ments would be akin to the traditional lost volume seller, and the defense then available.")); 
(6) architects (see R.F. Martin, Annotation, Burden of Proving Value of Relief from Performing Con­
tract in Suit Based on Defendant's Breach Preventing or Excusing Full Performance, 17 A.L.R.2D 968,
978-80 (1951) (citing Pond v. Wyman, 15 Mo. 175, 177 (1851) (involving an architect also performing
building superintendent work))); (7) business consultants (see Rochester Capital Leasing Corp. v. 
McCracken, 295 N.E.2d 375, 379 (Ind. Ct. App. 1973)); (8) lawyers (see Hom v. W. Land Ass'n, 22 
Minn. 233,234, 236-37 (1875) (attorney hired as corporate counsel avoided mitigation since corporation 
failed to show that he obtained other employment and compensation inconsistent with his engagement 
under the contract)); and (9) plumbers (see JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS 
§ 122 D. I, at 698 (3d ed. 1990) ("Consider ... an individual plumber who never subcontracts his work
and who has contracted to perform services that will require a full day's effort. If the owner repudiates 
that contract and the plumber proceeds to work elsewhere on the day scheduled to perform the original 
contract, must he deduct his earnings from the second job in mitigation of damages recovered from the
breached contract? It is certainly possible that the plumber could have performed the second contract as 
well as the first ifhe could have delayed the second job.") . 
44 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 347 cmt. f, illus. 16, 350 cmt. d, illus. 10 
( 1981) for two similar L VSP illustrations featuring such a parking lot paver. 
45 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 cmt. d ("[B]y discontinuing his own per­
formance [after breach], he avoids incurring additional costs of performance. This cost avoided is sub­
tracted from the loss in value caused by the breach .... " (citation omitted)); id. illus. 6 (stating that on a 
$100,000 contract, builder "would have to spend $60,000 more to finish the house .... [Builder] has a 
right to $40,000 in damages"); id. § 350 cmt. d, illus. 10 ("A contracts to pay B $20,000 for paving A's 
parking lot, which would give B a net profit of $3,000. A breaks the contract by repudiating it before B 
begins work. If B would have made the contract with A in addition to other contracts, B's efforts to 
obtain other contracts do not affect his damages. B's damages for A's breach of contract include his 
$3,000 loss of profit."). The Restatement's calculation follows the classic Luten Bridge case. Rocking­
ham Coty. v. Luten Bridge Co., 35 F.2d 301, 308 (4th Cir. 1929); see also Wright v. Davis, 193 S.W.2d 
294, 296 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) {"The measure [of damages] was the value of ... what he probably 
would have raised upon the land, deducting therefrom . .. the expense he would have incurred other 
than his own labor in cultivating, maturing and harvesting the crops." (emphasis added)). Likewise, if 
the paver would have paid someone to assist with the labor, the reduction also would include the amount 
of money that would have been paid to such other person but for the breach. See infra Part J.C. I, for the 
discussion of the subcontractor anomaly. 
46 See, e.g., Wright, 193 S.W.2d at 296 ("The measure [of damages) was the value of ... what he 
probably would have raised upon the land, deducting therefrom ... the expense he would have incurred 
other than his own labor in cultivating, maturing and harvesting the crops." (emphasis added)); see also 
RESTATEMENT {SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 347 (1981). As noted below, the occasional court has stated 
that the recovery should be reduced by the value of the labor even if it would have been performed by 
the contract party himself. As discussed below, this goes too far in the opposite direction. See infra note 
51 and accompanying text. 
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principles, this failure does grant the paver an undesirable "better than the 
bargain" result. These excessive damages may, in tum, unduly punish the 
owner's repudiation and may deter his/her efficient breach. 
As noted above, assume initially that new work opportunities are not 
available to the paver after the owner's repudiation.47 The paver now has 
more leisure time to the extent of her own excused personal performance. 
This increased leisure time gives the paver the "better than the bargain" 
result, with the above fairness and efficiency concems.48 This follows from 
the classic labor/leisure tradeoff, nicely captured by the following excerpt 
from a leading labor econoniics text: 
[I]ndividuals seek to maximize their well-being by consuming goods (such as fancy cars and
nice homes) and leisure. Goods have to be purchased in the marketplace. Because most ofus
are not independently wealthy, we must work in order to earn the cash required to buy the
desired goods. The economic trade-off is clear: If we do not work, we can consume a lot of 
leisure, but we have to do without the goods and services that make life more enjoyable. If
we do work, we will be able to afford many of these goods and services, but we must give up
some of our valuable leisure time.49 
In other words, when the paver is presented with a new contract oppor­
tunity, the paver faces the unavoidable tradeoff: sacrifice leisure for the 
cash profit on the contract or forego the cash profit to retain the valuable 
leisure time. But the paver receives a windfall under current law by reten­
tion of both the full cash profit and the liberated leisure time upon breach.50 
47 This initial assumption eases the exposition of the core principles. The actual Restatement
illustration considered the situation where the paver did take on new work. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS§ 347 cmt. f, illus. 16 (1981). This possibility will be discussed shortly. See infra Part 1.8. 
48 See discussion infra text accompanying notes 55-66, for a more tangible illustration of these
fairness and efficiency concerns, which expands upon the core facts of the basic illustration. 
49 GEORGE J. BORJAS, LABOR ECONOMICS 21 (6th ed. 2013).
50 Underappreciation of the compensated leisure flaw pervades other areas of the law as well. For
instance, legal analysts tend to also overvalue law degrees by once again neglecting the nonmonetary 
cost of the leisure sacrifice. See Michael Simkovic & Frank McIntyre, The Economic Value of a Law 
Degree 4 (Mar. 21, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=2379146, for the article that sparked the recent debate on the proper value of a law 
degree. Consider the following from a prior analysis critiquing the standard failure to take into account 
leisure when valuing a medical degree: "[E]xploiting an investment in human capital requires individu­
als to sacrifice not only consumption, but also leisure. When estimating the returns to education, existing 
studies typically weigh the monetary costs of schooling . . . against increased wages, neglecting the 
associated labor/leisure tradeoff." M. Keith Chen & Judith A. Chevalier, The Taste for Leisure, Career 
Choice, and the Returns to Education, 99 ECON. LETTERS 353,353 (2008). For further support, consider 
the following from another attuned medical study: "Investment in medical training appears quite attrac­
tive when no attention is paid to hours of work in each occupation .... Standardizing for hours worked 
in each occupation changes the picture markedly .... " Cotton M. Lindsay, Real Returns to Medical 
Education, 8 J. HUM. RESOURCES 331, 338 ( 1973). 
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2. Proper Amount of Compensated Leisure Reduction: Surplus
Value
What, then, is the appropriate adjustment for the compensated leisure 
windfall? Importantly, the proper correction does not eliminate any recov­
ery for the paver, as this would go too far in the other direction.s 1 As evi­
denced by his decision to enter into the contract, the paver preferred the 
contract price over leisure and would have realized his subjective net bene­
fit from such tradeoff but for the breach. Rather, the recovery should be 
reduced by the paver's value for his liberated leisure time, represented by 
his lowest acceptable price for the job.52 At these adjusted damages, the 
paver would receive his real benefit from the deal, equal to just the con­
tract's excess value to him after taking into account his subjective cost of 
performance. 
For instance, assume now that the paver would have accepted the job 
for any price above $9,000, his so-called "reservation price." The paver 
should receive only the $1,000 excess or "surplus" value of the contract, 
calculated as the $10,000 contract price less his $9,000 reservation price.s3 
The $1,000 surplus value captures his true benefit since a contract at $9,000 
(or less) would not provide him any benefit at all.s4 Note that the paver's 
$9,000 reservation price includes his price for both his labor and any neces­
sary materials like the asphalt. This $9,000 reduction exceeds the current 
adjustment, limited to just the necessary materials. 
This more limited $1,000 recovery corresponds much better to the 
fairness and efficiency goals of the benefit of the bargain norm. To make 
this more concrete, assume now that the parking lot owner receives an at­
tractive price for her property shortly after signing the contract. And while 
the owner valued the paved lot at an additional $11,000 for use in connec­
tion with her business, the new buyer places a much lower value on the 
51 The occasional court has stated that the recovery should be reduced by the value of the labor
saved by the contract party himself. See, e.g., Olds v. Mapes-Reeves Constr. Co., 58 N.E. 478, 479 
(Mass. 1900) ("In a contract of the kind before the court .... [t]he labor or supervision may be person­
ally performed by the contractor, or may be furnished through agents or employees. In either case the 
value of it is all included, for the benefit of the other party, when the contractor is charged with the 
whole cost of completing the work, as an amount to be deducted from the contract price in estimating 
his damages."). These decisions seem to suggest that the reduction should equal the market price for the 
labor. This measure, however, goes too far in the opposite direction by taking away the benefit of the 
bargain as to such labor component. 
52 Of course, this is in addition to any saved monetary costs.
53 See Barnes, supra note 17, at 14, for a more general argument in favor of using surplus value in 
contract damages. See Harrison, supra note 25, at 232, 234, for a more specific citation in this labor 
area. 
54 See Harrison, supra note 25, at 233 n.156. 
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paving of only $4,000.55 At the time of the contract signing, the job made
sense for both the owner and paver as this would generate a $1,000 benefit 
for each. 56 But now due to changed circumstances, completion of the job
would generate a $6,000 loss to the owner. 57 The $1,000 damage amount 
based upon the paver's reservation price leaves the paver equally well off as 
full performance while allowing the owner to avoid an additional unneces­
sary loss of $5,000.58 
In contrast, current law provides less desirable results. Assuming the 
materials cost $4,000, the owner would owe the paver $6,000 on breach, 
leaving the owner with a $6,000 loss regardless.59 But completion of the 
project would leave the paver with only a $1,000 net benefit, much less 
than the $6,000 upon the breach. 60 It is difficult, if not impossible, to justify 
these results as a matter of fairness. Why should the paver receive a $5,000 
windfall on breach only by forcing the owner to absorb the avoidable 
$5,000 loss? 
One attempted justification might claim that the owner must absorb 
the full extent of her now-bad deal. To show the inconsistency of such 
claim, assume now that the materials cost $8,000.61 A breach now limits the 
owner's loss to $2,000 as any avoidable material costs redound to the own­
er's benefit.62 As a matter of theory, the labor costs should not be treated
more harshly from the owner's perspective than the monetary costs. 63 And 
while the saved material costs seem more readily determinable than saved 
55 For some real world cases, see, for example, Rockingham Cnty. v. Luten Bridge Co., 35 F.2d
301,307 (4th Cir. 1929) (discussing a locality that no longer needed a bridge to nowhere); In re World­
Com, Inc., 361 B.R. 675, 679-80 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) (addressing situation where WorldCom no 
longer needed Jordan's advertising since WorldCom was bankrupt); see also supra notes 11-19 and 
accompanying text. 
56 The paver would receive the excess of $10,000 over her $9,000 reservation price and the owner
would receive $11,000 of value for a $ I 0,000 payment. 
57 The owner would now receive just $4,000 of value for her $10,000 payment to the paver.
58 The owner therefore takes only a $1,000 loss by breaching instead of $6,000. The owner has a
choice of receiving just $4,000 of value for a $10,000 payment (no breach) versus paying the paver the 
$1,000 on a breach ($10,000 - $9,000 reservation price). 
59 The owner now has a choice of receiving just $4,000 of value for a $10,000 payment (no
breach) versus paying the paver the $6,000 on a breach ($10,000 - $4,000 of saved costs). 
60 The paver's benefit would equal $1,000 absent a breach ($10,000 payment less his $9,000
reservation price) versus the $6,000 payment on a breach ($10,000 - $4,000 of saved costs). The majori­
ty of the paver's benefit on breach ($5,000) comes from his newly liberated leisure time, not the $1,000 
benefit of the bargain. 
61 For another alternative, consider the possibility that the paver subcontracted out some of the
labor. The labor would then appear as a monetary cost. See infra Part I.C.1. Consequently, this subcon­
tracted labor too would then redound to the owner's benefit under current law. 
62 Take, for example, the classic Luten Bridge case that required the nonbreaching party to stop
work upon breach and not pile on costs. Rockingham Cnty. v. Luten Bridge Co., 35 F.2d 301,307 (4th 
Cir. 1929). 
63 See Barnes, supra note 17, at 22.
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labor costs, this practical point will be addressed below.64 The aim here at 
this stage of the analysis is to show the correct adjustment in theory. 
Consider the efficiency justification supporting the more limited 
$1,000 surplus value recovery. To better frame the issues, assume now the 
materials cost $3,500 but all other factors remain the same. If so, the owner 
would realize a $6,500 loss upon breach under current law, but only a 
$6,000 loss upon completion. 65 The owner now has an incentive to force 
this inefficient project to completion to save a $500 loss. But this leads to 
an inefficient contract performance as it results in a $6,000 loss to the own­
er and just a $1,000 benefit to the paver. In contrast, the $1,000 surplus 
value recovery would induce the owner to scrap this inefficient project at no 
harm to the paver, while simultaneously increasing the fairness and con­
sistency of the law.66 
Finally, let's consider a comparative example to further develop the 
appeal of the surplus value approach: 
Example I: Igor and Indie each accept an extra $10,000 project for their services. Igor would 
have accepted the work for any price above $4,000 whereas lndie would not have agreed to 
64 See infra Part J.B. I (noting the argument that mitigation arguably provides a practical proxy 
outside the L VSP context, but demonstrating how the law currently lacks any such proxy within the 
L VSP context); infra Part III.A (showing several possible practical ways to approximate the actual 
reservation price in the LVSP context). Further note how the current LVSP determination also presents 
an unknowable fact since it requires assessment of a counterfactual situation in which breach has not 
occurred. As such, the question then becomes whether there exists a practical proxy which improves 
upon current law's seriously flawed result. Again, see infra Part III.A, for a more detailed discussion of 
all these points. 65 The owner now has a choice of receiving just $4,000 of value for a $10,000 payment (no
breach) versus paying the paver the $6,500 on a breach ($10,000 - $3,500 of saved costs). 
66 It is possible that the parties would negotiate a cancellation of the contract at a price which
would leave both parties better off (i.e., a price in between $1,000 and $6,000). As noted above, though, 
such negotiated cancellation might run into difficulties given transaction and related costs associated 
with such negotiation. See supra note 39. In some sense, renegotiation plays out like a high stakes poker 
game. Thus, the modified approach, which allows unilateral conduct, more easily leads to the efficient 
breach result. 
Even if the parties did negotiate out a breach, it is not clear from a fairness perspective why the paver 
should corral some of the efficiency gains by negotiating a settlement price above $1,000. Another 
attempted justification might argue that contract damages are otherwise undercompensatory due to 
attorney fees or the inadequate coverage of certain losses. But why then structure the law so that saved 
labor costs, but not other costs, strengthen the nonbreaching party's negotiating hand? See supra notes 
61-62 and accompanying text (regarding how other saved costs redound to the owner's benefit). And
more generally, why not then address problems of undercompensation more directly rather than relying
on some haphazard extra amount based on the extent to which the nonbreaching party would perform
labor under the contract?
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any price below $9,000. Again assume the counterparty repudiates without justification prior 
to any performance.67 
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Igor's surplus value equals $6,000 given his $4,000 minimum price for 
his leisure sacrifice.68 At first, a $6,000 recovery might still seem too gener­
ous as Igor would have worked for as little as $4,000. But Igor secured a 
$10,000 contract providing him $6,000 more than his breakeven point. Igor 
is properly entitled to this $6,000 gain given contract damage's goal to pro­
vide the benefit of the bargain. As such, it is the additional $4,000 equal to 
Igor's reservation price that constitutes the real windfall under current law. 
Current law operates as iflgor's reservation price is zero: that he (implausi­
bly) would have accepted the job for free. Finally, lndie would receive sig­
nificantly less than Igor under the surplus value approach: $1,000 rather 
than $6,000.69 But this result makes perfect sense given her significantly 
higher value ($9,000) for her liberated leisure time.70 
B. Case for Leisure Time Reduction Accentuates with New Work
New earnings after the breach increases the need for a leisure time ad­
justment. Section B.1 first discusses how L VSP status nullifies mitigation 
for new earnings. Section B.2 then shows how current law conflicts with 
the well-accepted economic principle of diminishing marginal utility. 
l. L VSP Negates Mitigation Response
Returning to the earlier Restatement illustration, let's assume now that 
the paver accepts another $10,000 paving contract after the breach. This 
would eliminate the compensated leisure problem if mitigation wiped out 
the $10,000 recovery on the breached contract ( due to the new $10,000 of 
earnings). If so, the paver would receive $10,000 total in return for his actu-
67 The reservation price would be bifurcated where partial performance had occurred prior to
breach to account for work already performed. 
68 $10,000 less $6,000 = $4,000.
69 $10,000 less $9,000 = $1,000. Especially with such comparison in mind, one might object on
grounds that each individual's reservation price is not readily determinable. Again, the discussion here 
focuses on the correct adjustment in theory. Practical considerations are addressed below. Particularly, 
see infra Part III.A, for several possible practical ways to approximate the actual reservation price 
(which includes the labor component) in the L VSP context. See also infra Part J.C. I (highlighting the 
significant practical problems under current law). 
70 Thus, Indie is not being penalized; she just has a lower surplus value. In other words, she is
much closer to the margin as to whether she even would take the job. 
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al work performance. 71 But as noted above, LVSP status negates any miti­
gation offset.72 In particular, mitigation does not apply if the paver "could 
and would have entered into the subsequent contract, even if the [ underly­
ing] contract had not been broken."73 As a consequence, the LVSP paver
receives $20,000 despite paving just one of the parking lots in question. 74 
The compensated leisure flaw remains intact even with the subsequent earn­
ings as the paver receives compensation for two jobs while sacrificing lei­
sure for just one. 
71 This actually would go too far where the paver would have handled both jobs as a LVSP. If so,
the paver should also receive the lost surplus value on the breached contract. 
72 See supra note 27 and accompanying text, for a discussion on the rule applicable to a LVSP. 73 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 cmt. f (1981). This comment in the Restate­
ment further provides that, in cases in which a contract has been breached, if there is a factual finding 
that an "injured party could and would have entered into the subsequent contract, even if the [underly­
ing] contract had not been broken, and could have had the benefit of both, he can be said to have 'lost 
volume' and the subsequent transaction is not a substitute for the broken contract." Id. For one court's 
more expansive standard, see Gianetti v. Norwalk Hosp., 43 A.3d 567, 578 (Conn. 2012) ( '"A "substi­
tute" is a contract which a volume seller who has suffered the Joss of one contract through the breach of 
another party has entered into in place of the broken contract and which the volume seller would not 
have been able, with his existing personnel and overhead costs, to perform had there been no 
breach.' ... Therefore, 'a party claiming to be a Jost volume seller must establish that it would have had 
the benefit of both the original contract and the subsequent contracts had there not been a 
breach .... This test has both objective and subjective components.' ... Specifically, 'to recover lost 
profits under [the lost volume seller] theory, a [nonbreaching] party must prove three things: [I) that the 
seller of services had the capability to perform both contracts simultaneously; [2] that the second con­
tract would have been profitable; and [3) that the seller of services probably would have entered into the 
second contract even if the first contract had not terminated.' The party claiming to be a lost volume 
seller has the burden of proving Jost volume seller status by a preponderance of the evidence." ( altera­
tions in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Gianetti v. Norwalk Hosp., 833 A.2d 891, 898 (Conn. 
2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 74 In actuality, the paver likely will be paving many parking lots. This L VSP possibility has not
received enough attention in the literature, which might help to explain why this problem has gone 
largely unrecognized. One commentator mentioned the LVSP possibility, but only in passing. See Harri­
son, supra note 25, at 208 n.6, 212 n.41, 228. As noted previously, the limited commentary in this area 
has focused on full-time employment, which might help to explain the Jack of focus on LVSPs as LVSP 
status becomes much more prominent outside the full-time employment scenario. Further note a link to 
the subcontracting anomaly discussed in Part J.C. I. Establishing L VSP status on the grounds that one 
could hire others to do the work would eliminate the compensated leisure problem to the extent of such 
subcontracted labor since saved monetary costs of not having to pay someone would reduce contract 
damages. The problem would still exist there, though, for any labor retained (e.g., supervisory work, 
etc.) by the LVSP. A more extensive problem occurs when the LVSP argues that he would be willing to 
do all the labor himself on the multiple projects. See, for example, supra note 43, for cases where labor­
ers made just such an argument in various settings. 
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2. Diminishing Marginal Utility on the Second Contract Anomaly
The economic principle of diminishing marginal utility further evi­
dences current law's flawed approach in the LVSP context. Under the di­
minishing marginal utility principle, an individual's value from consump­
tion of a good generally lessens as its consumption amount increases. 75 A 
classic example is how a second ice cream cone provides less pleasure than 
the first one. 76 Following the diminishing marginal utility principle, the 
LVSP's surplus value on each additional contract should decline for two 
reasons. 
First, as more projects are undertaken, the lost value of the foregone 
leisure generally should increase due to the diminishing marginal utility of 
leisure. 77 Compare two parking lot pavers presented with a new paving op­
portunity: the first one has several other active projects, while the second 
one has no existing commitments. In taking on the new project, the busy 
one generally should experience relatively more leisure harm as the idle one 
sacrifices less valuable leisure time.78 Tracking the classic ice cream exam­
ple, the busy one sacrifices the first ice cream cone while the idle one fore­
goes only the less valuable second one.79 
Second, the subjective value of the monetary compensation inversely 
relates to the number of work projects undertaken due to the diminishing 
75 Joshua Greene & Jonathan Baron, Intuitions About Declining Marginal Utility, 14 J. BEHAV.
DECISION MAKING 243,243 (2001) ("To say that a good exhibits declining marginal utility is to say that 
the more of that good that an individual has, the less valuable having more ofit will be to that individu­
al."). 
76 See, e.g., ROBERT E. HALL & MARC LIEBERMAN, MICROECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND 
APPLICATIONS 152-54 (6th ed. 2013). Likewise, the pleasure from the third ice cream cone generally is 
even less than from the second. Id at 153 (showing thirty units of utility gain from the first cone, twenty 
from the second, ten from the third, and so on down to zero from a sixth cone). 
77 Mark Bils, The Cyclical Behavior of Marginal Cost and Price, in 2- NEW KEYNESIAN
ECONOMICS: COORDINATION FAILURES AND REAL RIGIDITIES 417, 419 (N. Gregory Mankiw & David 
Romer eds., 1991) ("[T]he marginal disutility of work presumably increases with the level of hours."); 
see also Harrison, supra note 25, at 214; Naci Mocan & Duha T. Altindag, Is Leisure a Normal Good? 
Evidence from the European Parliament 24 (Kos; Univ.-Tiisiad Econ. Research Forum Working Paper 
Series, Paper No. 1120, 2011), available at http://eaf.ku.edu.tr/sites/eaf.ku.edu.tr/files/erf_wp_l 120.pdf 
(concluding that leisure is a ''normal good" for the members of the European Parliament). 
78 This might vary in certain cases due to differences in actual taste for leisure time. Nonetheless,
it is helpful to conceptualize this principle in generalized terms. As will be discussed more fully, the 
ultimate goal is to determine only a reasonable approximation of the reservation price. See infra Part III. 
79 This point is a little tricky due to the reverse application of diminishing marginal utility princi­
ples to a decreasing amount of the leisure good. As evidenced by the ice cream example, the conceptual 
trick involves seeing the extra work as taking away an earlier-stage consumption amount. The leisure 
loss harm therefore increases in lockstep with greater work commitments as the work takes away an 
item from someone who has less of such item. 
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marginal utility of money.so In taking on the new project, the idle paver's 
gain from the new income should exceed the busy one's increased utility. 
Again tracking the classic ice cream example, the idle one can now afford 
the more valuable first cone while the busy one earns money for the less 
valuable second cone. Linking the two aspects, the busy paver's surplus 
value from the new opportunity should be less than the idle one's due to 
less benefit from monetary compensation and more leisure harm. 
With that in mind, current law perversely insulates the LVSP from any 
offset from a subsequent project on grounds that the L VSP would have un­
dertaken both projects. Current law thus uses a multiple contract notion to 
allow the L VSP to keep the entire contract price without any reduction for 
the saved labor. But due to leisure harm and the diminishing marginal utili­
ty of money, the surplus value from each additional contract generally will 
be less than the immediately prior project, calling the multiple contract as­
sumption into question_s, 
The Article's prior reservation price terminology further demonstrates 
current law's anomalous results. A LVSP's reservation price on a second 
contract should be higher than on the first due to the diminishing marginal 
utility reasons above. As noted previously, though, current law's approach 
implicitly assumes a reservation price of zero on the breached contract. 
Treating the additional work as the first contract and the breached contract 
as the second,s2 how could the reservation price on a second contract under 
consideration be zero given that reservation prices typically mcrease on 
each additional contract?s3 
80 Greene & Baron, supra note 75, at 243-44 ("Money, for example, tends to exhibit declining
marginal utility, as illustrated by the fact that the utility you would gain from increasing your wealth 
from $1,000,000 to $1,001,000 would almost certainly be smaller than the utility you would gain from 
increasing your wealth from $1,000 to $2,000."). 
81 By definition the issue is whether the LVSP can keep the compensation from the first breached
contract added on top of the second (since the LVSP, of course, is entitled to keep the compensation 
from at least one contract). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 350 cmt. d (1981) ("[T]he se­
cond transaction is not a 'substitute' for the first one."). 
82 While the breached contract was entered into before the contract for the new work, it is appro­
priate here to consider the breached contract as additional work effort on top of the work actually per­
formed on the new contract. In other words, the new contract becomes the first contract and the 
breached contract is the second. This follows given the focus on the worker's true net loss from the 
excused contract and the worker's LVSP claim that he would have performed both contracts absent the 
breach. As such, the worker's saved effort on the breached contract relates to avoiding work on the 
second of the two signed contracts. 
83 Separately, it might be argued that an L VSP's willingness to work on multiple projects justifies
current law by showing a high preference for monetary compensation and/or a low value for leisure. But 
this argues too much notwithstanding some proven link between a willingness to take on multiple pro­
jects and a possible high preference for cash and/or low preference for leisure. It is one thing to say that 
perhaps the LVSP's willingness to take on multiple projects indicates a lower reservation price than the 
average laborer. It is a completely another thing to say that the reservation price for a L VSP is zero, 
especially as more work is undertaken. 
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The chart below visually reinforces the anomaly.84 The horizontal axis, 
moving from left to right, reflects increasing work hours. The vertical axis, 
moving from bottom to top, reflects increasing utility (money) or disutility 
(lost leisure).85 The downward sloping money utility curve measures the 
utility from the money obtained from the ever increasing work hours. The 
upward sloping leisure disutility curve measures the disutility of the leisure 
lost from the ever increasing work hours. As can be seen visually, the sur­
plus value starts out relatively high for the initial work hours, and then 






As a final point from the chart, the worker will decline the work once the 
leisure disutility matches or exceeds the money utility, starting at the point 
when the two curves meet. 
C. Final Supporting Arguments
This Section presents final supporting arguments for a leisure time re­
duction. Section C.1 exposes the current law's anomalous results based on 
whether the L VSP would subcontract out a portion of the work. Section C.2 
then shows why the L VSP setting refutes two possible offsets to the leisure 
time benefit. 86 
In addition, a practical point further shows the weakness of current law. One cannot know for sure that 
the LVSP would have taken on all the actual projects absent the breach since this question raises a 
counterfactual situation. Rather, the courts must make their best determination as to the likelihood of the 
L VSP's actions in this counterfactual situation. See infra Part III.A, for more on this uncertainty. 
84 See Harrison, supra note 25, at 213 (presenting a similar graph).
85 The "absolute" utility heading for the vertical axis captures the fact that both the money utility
and the leisure disutility are mapped together as positive numbers. 
86 The two potential claims are that the liberated leisure time makes up for either (I) lost nontan­
gible benefits from working; or (2) time spent looking for new work after the breach. 
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1. The Subcontracting Anomaly
Consider the possibility that the contractor would hire assistance for 
the contracted labor. This exposes a disturbing anomaly under current law: 
the labor effort reduces the recovery but only if performed by someone oth­
er than the contractor. 87 In a sense, contract damage law acts as if work ef­
fort imposes a cost only when performed by someone else.88 But if that
were true, why would a contractor pay for such assistance rather than work­
ing alone?89 In reality, the contractor balances her own lost leisure cost 
against the subcontractor's monetary charge.90 And regardless of her choice, 
the contractor experiences a very real cost. Again, an example will illus­
trate: 
Example 2: Igor and lndie each agree to take on an extra $100,000 project. Igor would have 
accepted the work for any price above $70,000 while lndie would not have agreed for any 
price below $90,000. A subcontractor now offers to do the work for $80,000 after the con­
tract signings. The counterparty again breaches prior to performance. 
What are the correct damages for each? Absent the breach, Indie 
should farm out the work since she could save leisure time valued at 
$90,000 for only $80,000. This would increase her benefit on the contract 
to $20,000.91 In contrast, Igor should do all the work himself since the sub-
87 See, e.g., Wright v. Davis, 193 S.W.2d 294,296 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) ("[T]o earn the consid­
eration ..  appellant would have to expend his labor and would be compelled to hire additional labor. It 
is ... beyond the power of one man to chop, cultivate and pick fifty acres of land in cotton .... The 
measure [of damages] was the value of ... what he probably would have raised upon the land, deduct­
ing therefrom ... the expense he would have incurred other than his own labor in cultivating, maturing 
and harvesting the crops." (emphasis added)). 
88 This is the flip side to the issue of whether a party suing for reliance costs incurred in perform­
ing a contract can collect for their nonmonetary labor effort. In theory, the answer should be yes. United 
States v. Behan, 110 U.S 338,345 (1884) ("But when he elects to go for damages for the breach of the 
contract, the first and most obvious damage to be shown is, the amount which he has been induced to 
expend on the faith of the contract, including a fair allowance for his own time and services."). But in 
actuality, one's own service time tends to get overlooked in this flip side scenario as well. See, e.g., 
Patterson, supra note 43, at 1306. Cf Worcester Heritage Soc'y, Inc. v. Trussell, 577 N.E.2d 1009, IOI I 
(Mass. App. Ct. 1991) (stating that in determining defendant's partial performance, trial court properly 
took into account not just cash expenditures but also the "sweat equity" of the defendant's own labor). 
89 In certain extreme cases, there is no choice but to seek assistance given the physical limitations
of one person. See, e.g., Wright, 193 S.W.2d at 295-96 (presenting a scenario where the contractor 
lacked the physical capacity to perform all the work himself). But the subcontractor possibility arises 
even where the contractor has the physical capacity to perform the work alone. 
90 See supra Part I.A. I ( discussing the labor/leisure tradeoft).
91 Following the earlier analysis, Indie's surplus value is just $10,000 if she does the work herself,
based on her $90,000 reservation price. Farming out the work increases her benefit to the $20,000 net: 
$100,000 contract price less the $80,000 subcontractor payment. This assumes a negligible oversight 
responsibility for Indie. 
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contractor's $80,000 cost exceeds his $70,000 leisure time value. Following 
the earlier analysis, Igor's lost benefit is his $30,000 surplus value, based 
off his $70,000 reservation price. 
Indie receives the correct $20,000 under current law, but only upon a 
factual finding that Indie would have hired the subcontractor.92 If so, the 
"saved" $80,000 subcontractor cost reduces the $100,000 contract price. In 
contrast, Igor receives the full $100,000 without reduction because he 
would have performed the work himself. In sum, current law reduces dam­
ages for the labor element, but only where the work would have been done 
by someone other than the contracting party. 93 
The subcontractor possibility uncovers significant practical difficulties 
under current law in addition to its theoretic shortcomings. Consider Wright 
v. Davis,94 where the court allowed some reduction in damages for saved
subcontractor labor, stating that: "It is ... beyond the power of one man to
chop, cultivate and pick fifty acres of land in cotton ... . "95 But even this
threshold inquiry on the propriety of some reduction becomes much more
complicated for less labor intensive contracts.96 And beyond such threshold
inquiry, further difficulties arise in determining the extent and pricing of the
subcontracted-out work.97 
2. LVSP Nullifies Two Possible Offsetting Claims
To complete this Part's presentation of the current flawed approach, 
this Section considers whether the liberated leisure time properly compen­
sates the laborer for either (1) lost job search time after the breach; or 
92 See Crews v. Cortez, 113 S.W. 523,526 (Tex. 1908) ("The rights of the parties are founded on
the contract, and the wrong done is compensated for when the injured party is allowed the full value 
which he would have produced, less the expense of which he has been relieved."). 
93 Focusing on the breaching party provides another way to see the anomalous results. The breach­
ing party must cover either the full price for the labor or nothing at all depending on whether the labor is 
subcontracted. Under a surplus value proposal, the breaching party could pay a varying amount depend­
ent on the LVSP's reservation price for the contract. The varying results under such a proposal make 
sense, though, from the breaching side's perspective as well since it only incentivizes so-called "effi­
cient breaches." See supra notes 33-41 and accompanying text (discussing "efficient breach"). 
94 193 S.W.2d 294 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945).
95 Id. at 296.
96 In this regard, recall the broad category of potential L VSPs: plumbers, doctors, lawyers, pavers,
masons, architects, etc. See supra note 43. 
97 The appellate court in Wright glossed over these complications, apparently leaving those issues
to the lower court, as it merely stated that proper deduction should be made for "the expense he would 
have incurred other than his own labor in cultivating, maturing and harvesting the crops." Wright, 193 
S.W.2d at 296 (emphasis added). The inquiry relates to a counterfactual assessment of what would have 
happened absent an actual breach. Cf discussion infra Part III.A (stating difficulties with current law's 
absolute L VSP determination of whether the laborer would have taken on both jobs absent the actual 
breach). 
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(2) lost nontangible benefits from the job. As will be shown, neither possi­
bility justifies the lack of a leisure adjustment for L VSPs.
a. Offsetting Job Search Efforts?
Might job search efforts after the breach satisfactorily offset the leisure 
time gained from the excused contractual work effort? If a discharged 
worker fails to seek substitute work, the reasonable diligence component of 
mitigation reduces the recovery by the compensation possible from reason­
ably available comparable work.98 A discharged employee thus might need 
to spend some of his newly liberated leisure time after the breach seeking 
such substitute employment.99 
Similar to the earlier mitigation analysis of compensation earned from 
subsequent work, though, the reasonable diligence doctrine generally does 
not impact L VSPs. The classic L VSP laborer-the parking lot paver, ma­
son, architect, etc.-generally handles multiple projects simultaneously and 
undertakes efforts to generate a regular stream of business. 100 For this rea­
son, the typical L VSP case does not involve the failure to seek new work, 
but rather the mitigation issue discussed earlier of whether the recovery 
should be reduced by compensation actually earned after the breach. 101 
Given their ability to handle multiple work projects, some courts have 
granted L VSPs immunity from mitigation seemingly regardless of their 
search efforts. 102 Such immunity from any offset despite the lack of re­
placement efforts further evidences current law's weakness. Passive 
postbreach behavior potentially indicates a real taste for leisure and a corre-
98 See, e.g., In re Worldcom, Inc., 361 B.R. 675, 696-97 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007).
99 See, e.g., Kelly supra note 25, at 207.
IOO This possibility therefore is more apt in the case of a full-time employee who chooses not to
work at all after the breach, rather than an LVSP. Even in such case, though, it is unlikely that the re­
quired search efforts would meaningfully offset the saved work effort on the contract. See supra note 43. 
IOI See, e.g., Gianetti v. Norwalk Hosp., 43 A.3d 567, 599-600 (Conn. 2012); Lone Star Ford, Inc.
v. McCormick, 838 S.W.2d 734, 740 (Tex. App. 1992); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 347
cmt. f, illus. 16 ( 1981 ).
!OZ See Rochester Capital Leasing Corp. v. McCracken, 295 N.E.2d 375,379 (Ind. Ct. App. 1973)
(finding business consultant not subject to mitigation as "there was evidence from which the jury might 
have concluded that [he] could have earned other income and yet have stood ready and able to serve ... 
as consultant"); see also Lone Star, 838 S.W.2d at 740 (stating, in dicta, that if"the nonbreaching party 
was legally free to enter into similar contracts with other [sic], the fact that ... the wronged party could 
have made similar contracts does not reduce the damages"). See In re Worldcom, 361 B.R. at 690, for 
one interesting case where such an argument failed. In In re Worldcom, basketball superstar Michael 
Jordan did not seek any comparable endorsement work, and the court rejected Jordan's claim that he 
was immune from mitigation because he legally could have taken on a second endorsement contract 
simultaneously. Id. at 688. This case, though, is not the standard L VSP case. 
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spondingly lower surplus value. 103 Nonetheless, the LVSP is granted a full 
recovery. 
b. Offsetting Nontangible Benefits?
Finally, might a worker receive significant nonmonetary benefits from 
having a steady work job? 104 If so, the lost nontangible benefits from em­
ployment might sufficiently offset the gained leisure time on breach. While 
such a satisfactory offset is highly debatable even for a full-time employ­
ee, 105 this claim disintegrates in the L VSP context for reasons similar to the 
job search offset. By definition, the classic LVSP handles multiple projects 
without regard to the work under the breached contract, thereby already 
avoiding any nonmonetary downside to unemployment. 106 
*** 
In sum, the L VSP context entails a significant flaw of compensated 
leisure given the general lack of mitigation or other potential offsets. This 
leads to a troubling "all-or-nothing" approach under current law. On the one 
hand, a successful LSVP claim allows full retention of damages without 
any leisure offset. On the other hand, an unproven L VSP claim can lead to a 
full denial of any recovery due to mitigation. After Part II shows why the 
leisure problem persists for full-time employees, Part III then considers 
feasible leisure offsets. 
II. COMPENSATED LEISURE FLAW FOR FULL-TIME EMPLOYEES
The compensated leisure flaw analysis shifts for full-time employees 
since the inability to hold down two full-time jobs precludes LVSP status. 107 
103 See infra Part TI, for the comparable discussion for full-time employees.
104 Cf Eisenberg, supra note 27, at 1153 ("Given normal economic and psychological needs, few
persons are likely to turn down a satisfactory job in favor of inactivity and the chance of recovering 
damages that would put them in no better financial position than would the replacement job."). See 
generally Y. Hossein Fanin & Ken-Ichi Akao, Non-pecuniary Work Incentive and Labor Supply I, 3 
(Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Working Paper No. 21.2006, 2006), available at http://www.feem.it/ 
userfiles/attach/Publication/NDL2006/NDL2006-021.pdf (extending the standard labor supply model 
"(b ]y incorporating the positive nonpecuniary effects of employment on individual well-being"). 
lOS See discussion infra Part H.B.
106 This is not to say that there could never be nonmonetary gains from an additional project, but
rather that, as a general rule, any such benefits are unlikely to match the benefits from the liberated 
leisure time. See Eisenberg, supra note 27, at 1153 ("[F]ew persons are likely to turn down a satisfactory 
job in favor of inactivity .... " (emphasis added)). 
107 There is a limited LVSP possibility for part-time only work which could, and would, have been
taken on absent the breach. For simplicity, this Part will refer to this group collectively as employees 
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Discharged employees who stay idle thus might end up with only uncom­
pensated leisure time for failure to mitigate their damages. 108 Mitigation 
also blocks a double cash recovery for just a single leisure sacrifice if the 
employee undertakes new work after the breach. 109 Current law therefore
might appear to sufficiently address the compensated leisure problem for 
full-time employees, 110 particularly given the possible noncash benefits
from full-time employment. 
But while the compensated leisure problem lessens compared to 
L VSPs, this Part demonstrates room for substantial improvement for full­
time employees as well. Section A highlights another undesirable "all-or­
nothing" outcome under mitigation: the comparability or noncomparability 
of rejected new work. Section B discusses why nontangible benefits typi­
cally do not offset the gained leisure value. 
A. Serious Defects in Application of the Mitigation Offset
The effectiveness of the mitigation offset for full-time employees de­
pends upon the comparability of available postbreach work to the relieved 
performance. For very close substitute work, mitigation works relatively 
well. Palagi v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. 111 nicely illustrates the
essence of mitigation's appeal. Palagi's employer breached the employment 
contract by selling the business to a third party without Palagi's consent. 112 
The new owner offered to continue Palagi's job without any adverse chang­
es, but Palagi eventually resigned and sued the original employer for the 
contract amount. 113 The court found this to be an easy mitigation case as
Palagi turned down an off er to work "in the same place, at the same desk, at 
the same job, at the same pay. Given these facts, the puzzling question re­
mains: What are Plaintiffs damages?" 114 
even though it can include some nonemployees. Further note that full- versus part-time status is not the 
ultimate determinant of whether someone is an employee or independent contractor, but nonetheless it 
remains a useful shorthand distinction for this Article's purposes. 
108 Kelly, supra note 25, at 185-86.
109 The concern here is no longer compensated leisure but a related double cash recovery. Note
how this is different than for L VSPs where the issue remains compensated leisure since the L VSP would 
have worked both projects (or so they argue) but for the breach; not so here as the employee cannot 
handle both jobs simultaneously. 
110 See Kelly, supra note 25, at 192-95, for one commentator who seems to take such a view in the
employment context based primarily on the mitigation possibility. For instance, mitigation will step in 
to block an attempted receipt of compensated leisure by turning down comparable new work after the 
breach. 
I I I 69 F. Supp. 2d 903 (S.D. Tex. 1999). 
112 Id. at 904-05. The contract prohibited assignment of the employer's obligations without con­
sent. Id. at 904. 113 Id. at 904-05. 114 Id. at 907.
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Current law appropriately gave Palagi a choice between uncompen­
sated leisure and the surplus value on the breached contract (by accepting 
the true "comparable"). In other words, current law nicely blocked Palagi 
from obtaining a compensated leisure windfall by requiring that he take the 
truly comparable job to retain the contract surplus value. 115 
Moving beyond Palagi' s virtually identical job scenario, 116 current law 
maintains its appeal so long as the substitute work is close enough to the 
original employment that one can still exclaim "What are the damages?" 
But mitigation falls short where the new work is not such an extremely 
close substitute. Drawing upon some litigated cases, suppose now the newly 
available work entails a longer commute, 117 lesser compensation, 118 or dif­
ferent responsibilities. 119 Should the innocent-party employee be forced to 
account for the failure to take on such different, arguably inferior, work? 
115 Palagi should have taken the truly comparable job absent an intervening change to his la­
bor/leisure preference. Palagi likewise would have been correctly denied any recovery if he retained the 
job since he should not receive a double compensation when he could not handle the two positions 
simultaneously. It might seem obvious here that Palagi could not do both jobs since the "substitute" job 
was really just a continuation of his original job. While that is true, it might be helpful to think of Palagi 
as more broadly representing very close substitute jobs with a different employer: in other words, anoth­
er job with the same general geographic location, compensation, job title, and responsibilities. In this 
regard, note that the jobs in Palagi were not truly identical due to the change of the boss in connection 
with the ownership sale. See generally Christa H.S. Bouwman, The Role of Corporate Culture in Mer­
gers and Acquisitions, in MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: PRACTICES, PERFORMANCE AND PERSPECTIVES 
109, 110-13, 119-20 (Etienne Perrault ed., 2013), available at http://faculty.weatherhead.case.edu/ 
bouwman/downloads/BouwmanCorpCultureM&A%20Dec2012.pdf (examining the literature that looks 
at different types of corporate culture and the effects it may have on mergers and acquisitions­
including on personnel); Marianne Bertrand & Antoinette Schoar, Managing with Style: The Effect of 
Managers on Firm Policies 2, 4 (Mar. 2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.mit.edu/ 
~aschoar/ceostyle.pdf (examining how different management styles can significantly affect corporate 
behavior and performance). 
116 See supra note 115, for an explanation of how the job was not completely identical due to the
change in ownership. 
117 See, e.g., Donlin v. Philips Lighting N. Am. Corp., 581 F.3d 73, 89-90 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding a
discharged warehouse worker sufficiently mitigated her damages where she took a lesser paying job 
closer to home than a higher paying job with a thirty-two-mile commute); BPS Guard Servs., Inc. v. 
Int'! Union of United Plant Guard Workers of Am., Local 228, 45 F.3d 205, 211 (7th Cir. 1995) (con­
cluding that a security guard did not fail to mitigate where one substitute job was eighty miles away). 
118 Compare Boone v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 619 S.E.2d 708, 712 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) (denying
recovery for teacher's failure to mitigate where declined new job used same skills at lower pay), with 
BPS Guard Servs., 45 F.3d at 205 (not applying mitigation to a security guard where another substitute 
job offered lower pay and less benefits). 
119 See, e.g., Zhou v. LaGrange Acad. Inc., 597 S.E.2d 522, 523, 525, 527 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004)
( denying recovery to a discharged orchestra director who refused a reworked contract to teach classes 
instead at the school at the same salary). Cf Parker v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 474 P.2d 689, 
693-94 (Cal. I 970) (not subjecting actress Shirley MacLaine to mitigation for rejecting alternative
western movie after Fox breached contract for musical).
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If the employee declines the new work on grounds of inferiority, cur­
rent law once again provides problematic "all-or-nothing" results. 120 A 
noncomparability finding allows full retention of the cash compensation 
rather than just the lower surplus value. 121 Similar to current law's flawed 
treatment of L VSPs, a noncomparability determination implicitly contains 
an implausible assumption that the employee would have accepted the 
breached contract for free. 122 On the other hand, a comparability finding 
results in the polar extreme: elimination of any recovery, including an in­
correct deprivation of any surplus value. 123 This bipolarity places tremen­
dous, and arguably excessive, weight on determining what constitutes com­
parable work. 
Beyond providing incorrect results, current law also weakens incen­
tives to work. Because actual earned wages from substitute work reduce the 
recovery regardless of job comparability, the employee obtains the leisure 
windfall only by turning down the noncomparable work. 124 This incentiviz­
es the employee to decline new work when confident of a noncomparability 
finding. 125 Beyond encouraging inefficient idleness, current law essentially 
forces a difficult choice upon the innocent-party employee. The employee 
can decline the work, gambling on a noncomparability finding to retain the 
compensated leisure windfall, but risking full denial of even the surplus 
value. Or the employee can play it safe by accepting arguably inferior work, 
thereby sacrificing any extra surplus on the original contract. 
120 See, e.g., Parker, 474 P.2d at 691, 693-94 (holding that actress Shirley Macl..aine could retain
the full contract price without reduction after Fox pulled the plug on the contracted musical and instead 
offered her an "inferior" role, at the same pay, in a western movie). The court reasoned "the female lead 
as a dramatic actress in a western style motion picture can by no stretch of imagination be considered 
the equivalent of or substantially similar to the lead in a song-and-dance production." Id at 694. 
121 See discussion supra Part I.A.2.
122 See supra Part I.A.2. Again, the employee is properly entitled to just his/her surplus value.
Retention of the entire contract price essentially equates the full contract price with surplus value, there­
by implying a reservation price of zero. 
123 For ease of exposition, assume the comparable work provides a matching amount of compensa­
tion. Arguably, the loss should be only the excess of the surplus value on the breached contract over the 
surplus value on the substitute work as the employee had the option to recapture some surplus value via 
the alternative. But as the substitute work moves away from a pure match with the breached contract, a 
counterargument in favor of the full surplus value on the breached contract becomes more compelling. 
From a fairness perspective, why should the innocent employee be forced to account for the fact that 
he/she did not take on substitute work that contained some noticeable differences from the original 
contract? Somewhat related, such rejection serves as a weaker indicator that there was little or no sur­
plus value on the breached contract as the differences become more meaningful. 
124 See Kelly, supra note 25, at 219-20.
125 See Evans, supra note 25, at 15 (suggesting that older workers therefore have a greater incen­
tive to tum down new work). 
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Perhaps mindful of the employee's dilemma, current law generally 
imposes a high threshold for comparability. 126 But this exacerbates the 
compensated leisure problem for breaching employers as employees can 
more readily turn down new work to retain the compensated leisure. 127 Un­
der current mitigation, there is an unavoidable tension between undue pres­
sure on the innocent employee or an enhanced compensated leisure prob­
lem. 
B. Noncash Benefits Fail to Offset: Work Hurts!
As noted in Part I, 128 the nonmonetary benefits of work arguably justi­
fy current law's failure to account for liberated leisure time other than 
through the unreliable mitigation offset. 129 However, the net disutility of 
work negates such claim. In sum, work hurts. 
The attempted justification of nonmonetary offsets essentially claims 
that employees would generally work for free. 130 But recall the earlier liti­
gated cases, like Palagi, where discharged employees remained idle after 
the breach by rejecting different work. 131 This rich body of case law rejects 
the "work for free" proposition. 132 Market forces and common sense intui­
tion further support such rejection. For instance, wouldn't market wages 
generally be much lower if most people would work for free? 
*** 
Although less severe than the L VSP context, the compensated leisure 
flaw persists for full-time employees despite the possible mitigation offset. 
The "all-or-nothing" approach based on work comparability raises an in­
herent tradeoff between employee hardship and compensated leisure. As 
with L VSPs, the compensated leisure problem conflicts with both the fair-
126 See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 25, at 246-49; see also Sellers v. Delgado Cmty. Coll., 839 F.2d
1132, I 138 (5th Cir. 1988) ("'Substantially equivalent employment' [is] ... employment which affords 
virtually identical promotional opportunities, compensation, job responsibilities, working conditions, 
and status as the position from which the ... claimant has been ... terminated."). 
127 This has led two commentators to consider a possible relaxation of the comparability standard.
See Evans, supra note 25, at 17-21 (proposing an expanded mitigation offset based on evidence of the 
earnings of similarly situated employees); Harrison supra note 25, at 215-22. Note, though, how this 
then puts more pressure on the innocent-party employee to take on lesser work. 
128 See supra Part I.
129 See supra Section I.C.2.b. This prior discussion evaluated this highly debatable proposition in
the LVSP context where it failed to pass even initial muster since the LVSP, by definition, already 
handles other work projects simultaneously without regard to the breached contract. 
130 Or in terms of the earlier framework, that the surplus value equals the full contract price due to
a zero reservation price. 
131 See supra notes 111-20 and accompanying text.
132 See supra notes 111-20 and accompanying text.
322 GEO. MASON L. REV. [VOL. 22:2 
ness and efficiency goals of contract law. The Part that follows outlines 
practical solutions to the inaccuracy and inflexibility of current law on con­
tract damages, both for LVSPs and full-time employees. 
III. CORRECTING THE COMPENSATED LEISURE FLAW
The compensated leisure flaw in contract damages stems in part from 
the current "all-or-nothing" approaches to LVSP status and work compara­
bility. These rigid determinations fail to approximate the unobserved reser­
vation wages of innocent-party laborers. A more flexible approach to these 
LVSP and comparability determinations would lessen current law's com­
pensated leisure problem and move contract damages closer to the fair and 
efficient "benefit of the bargain" standard. 
This Part thus proposes a more adjustable approach to L VSP status 
and work comparability, thereby providing a better proxy for the reserva­
tion prices of laborers. Section A proposes two refined methods for LVSPs: 
(1) a sliding scale approach whereby the recovery percentage decreases
inversely related to the strength of the L VSP finding; and (2) the use of
labor elasticity studies, which analyze how wage changes impact work de­
cisions. Turning to full-time employees, Section 111.B proposes a similar
sliding scale keyed to the substitute job's degree of comparability.
A. Flexible Determinations of LVSP Status
To recap from Part I, L VSP status nullifies the mitigation offset for 
new work. This places tremendous pressure on the L VSP determination. A 
successful LSVP claim grants full compensation from both the breached 
and substitute jobs without any leisure offset. At the other extreme, a failed 
L VSP claim denies any recovery under mitigation. 133 This presents two 
main problems. First, the L VSP finding contains a degree of uncertainty 
given its counterfactual inquiry. 134 Second, the resulting consequences go 
too far even assuming the correctness of the finding. 135 For instance, a posi-
133 This assumes the subsequent earnings at least equal the breached contract price. See supra
Part II, for a more extensive discussion of mitigation. 
134 The inquiry focuses on what the contractor would have done if the (actual) breach had not
occurred. So, for instance, an erroneous court finding against LVSP status incorrectly limits the contrac­
tor to the surplus value from just one contract, rather than both. 
135 This is due to LVSP damages in excess of the laborer's reservation price for the work (i.e.,
compensated leisure). 
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tive L VSP finding implicitly contains an implausible assumption that the 
contractor would have taken the;: additional job for free. 136 
This Section considers more balanced improvements to the current 
"all-or-nothing" extremes. Section A.1 presents a sliding scale approach 
whereby the contract recovery percentage decreases inversely related to the 
strength of the L VSP finding. A higher degree of confidence in the L VSP 
finding thus would trigger a lesser percentage reduction, although such re­
duction would stay positive in even a slam dunk L VSP case. 137 Section A.2 
presents an alternate pathway based on labor elasticity studies, which ana­
lyze how wage changes impact work decisions. 
1. Sliding Scale Likelihood Approach
A contractor must prove LVSP status by a "preponderance of the evi­
dence" under current law. 138 This equates to a finding of just "more likely
than not," requiring only slightly higher than a 50 percent possibility. 139 
This falls well below the "clear and convincing evidence" and "beyond all 
reasonable doubt" standards used for fraud and criminal convictions. 140 A 
successful L VSP claim nullifies any offset despite potentially meeting only 
this low 50 percent threshold. 141 As developed below, more detailed LVSP 
findings with different likelihood gradations therefore would provide two 
key improvements: a hedge against a faulty L VSP finding and useful in­
formation to help approximate the lost surplus value from the breached 
contract. 
Such an approach would reduce the recovery by a sliding scale per­
centage inversely related to the L VSP likelihood finding. The reduction 
would decrease as the L VSP probability strengthens since more confidence 
in the L VSP finding should indicate a lower reservation price ( with a corre­
spondingly higher surplus value). 142 For example, the recovery could be 
reduced by 50 percent for a mere "likely" finding; 25 percent for a "highly 
136 In the other direction, a negative L VSP finding implicitly contains an assumption that the
surplus value on the second project at least matches the first. This assumes that the compensation on the 
new work at least equals the compensation on the breached contract. 
13 7 A positive reservation price remains likely even in such a clear-cut case.
138 Gianetti v. Norwalk Hosp., 43 A.3d 567,578 (Conn. 2012); Bitterroot Int'! Sys., Ltd. v. W. Star
Trucks, Inc., 153 P.3d 627,639 (Mont. 2007). 
139 Louis Kaplow, Burden of Proof, 121 YALE L.J. 738, 741-44 (2012).
140 Id. at 779.
141 As shown above, even a "virtually certain" LVSP should receive just the surplus value, not the
contract price. See supra p. 24 and notes 22, 136 and accompanying text. 
142 Again, a lower reservation price leads to a higher recovery since the surplus value equals the
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likely" finding; and 10 percent for an "extremely likely" finding. 143 In addi­
tion to providing a useful surplus value indicator, this approach hedges 
against a faulty L VSP finding since a larger reduction tracks greater doubts 
as to the contractor's asserted LVSP claim. 144 
For an illustrative case, consider Gianetti v. Norwalk Hospita/. 145 Dr. 
Gianetti was an attending physician at several hospitals. 146 Norwalk im­
properly terminated his privileges but claimed mitigation for his subsequent 
higher earnings at the other hospitals. 147 The appellate court upheld 
Gianetti' s L VSP claim, albeit in lukewarm fashion. 148 After recognizing 
Norwalk's point that Gianetti did not seek new hospital affiliations post 
breach, the court noted that "it is within the province of the trial court ... 
to ... determine the credibility" that another hospital was too far away. 149 
The court held that the trial court's LVSP finding "was not clearly errone­
ous," emphasizing how Gianetti needed to prove his L VSP status by only 
"a [mere] preponderance," rather than "uncontroverted and overwhelming 
evidence." 150 In sum, the opinion reads like only a "likely" case, thereby 
justifying a 50 percent haircut in light pf the uncertainty surrounding 
Gianetti 's L VSP claim. 
Finally, the sliding scale proposal's overall appeal remains strong de­
spite some imperfection and complexity. Despite failing to capture the ex­
act surplus value, the proposal's moderating approach aligns with actual 
surplus values much better than the current "all-or-nothing" extremes rest­
ing on an up-or-down determination of L VSP status. 151 Furthermore, the 
proposal minimizes new complexity by modifying an already required fac-
143 If helpful, this approach could draw upon the already familiar "clear and convincing evidence" 
and/or "beyond a reasonable doubt" standards for such higher likelihood categories. The textual presen­
tation avoids such linkage, though, since their use in other particularized settings might implicate other 
issues not present here. 
144 This approach also could be used if the contractor loses in a close LVSP case given the possibil­
ity of a faulty negative finding. For instance, a higher 70 percent reduction upon a mere "unlikely" 
finding might appeal since an erroneous anti-LVSP finding incorrectly deprives the contractor of any 
surplus value if mitigation wipes out the recovery. There are also possible improvements to the non­
L VSP world. See infra Part III.B. If implemented, these improvements for non-LVSPs would decrease 
the significance of this possibility of a faulty negative finding. 
145 43 A.3d 567,574 (Conn. 2012). 
146 Gianetti v. Norwalk Hosp., 43 A.3d 567,574 (Conn. 2012). 
147 Id. at 575, 580. 
148 Id. at 575. 
149 Id. at 581-82 (quoting State v. Lawrence, 920 A.2d 236,247 (Conn. 2007)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 150 Id. at 578-79, 582. 
151 The exact surplus value is an unknowable fact. Somewhat related, the current determination
likewise turns on an unknowable fact: whether the contractor in fact would have taken on the new work 
absent the actual breach. 
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tual determination. 152 Likewise, current law often utilizes sliding scales and 
likelihood determinations other than the preponderance of the evidence 
standard. 153 In this regard, this proposal's significant benefits provide a very 
favorable tradeoff against its minimal complications. 
2. Tax and Labor Supply Elasticity Approach
Labor elasticity studies present an alternate pathway by quantifying 
the impact of wage changes on work decisions. 154 A higher elasticity re-
152 More generally, improved equitable results often impose some extra complexity. Consider, for 
instance, the U.S. tax code. A familiar critique concerns its excessive complexity. See, e.g., Sheldon D. 
Pollack, Tax Complexity, Ref<�rm, and the Illusions of Tax Simplification, 2 GEO. MASON INDEP. L. REV. 
319,358 (1994) ("The tax code has become a massive and impenetrable edifice of rules and regulations 
that describe and govern nearly all spheres of economic life and business activity."). But one reason for 
such complexity is the desire to apportion tax burdens in a fair manner. See Jeffrey Partlow, The Neces­
sity of Complexity in the Tax System, 13 WYO. L. REV. 303,305 (2013) (discussing the fairness basis and 
other reasons). The tax code could be simplified by having everyone pay the same amount under a 
"head" tax, but most people would agree that such equal liability would be patently unfair. See, e.g., Lee 
Anne Fennell & Kirk J. Stark, Taxation Over Time, 59 TAX L. REv. I, 22 (2005) ("Yet despite these 
efficiency benefits, head taxes are almost universally rejected on the basis that they inadequately dis­
criminate among taxpayers with varying levels of ability to pay."); Nancy C. Staudt, The Hidden Costs 
of the Progressivity Debate, 50 V AND. L. REV. 919, 947 (1997) ("[N]o theorist has ever seriously advo­
cated the head tax, which is perceived to be the most efficient tax."); Linda Sugin, A Philosophical 
Objection to the Optimal Tax Model, 64 TAX L. REV. 229, 231-32 (2011) ("Because a head tax is due in 
a fixed and equal amount no matter a person's financial circumstance, it strikes most people as funda­
mentally unfair and arbitrary."). 
153 See, e.g., Developmental Servs. Network v. Douglas, 666 F.3d 540, 544 (9th Cir. 201 I) ("Plain­
tiffs seeking a preliminary injunction ... must establish that they are likely to succeed on the merits, that 
they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities 
tips in their favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest. We have glossed that standard by 
adding that there is a 'sliding scale' approach which allows a plaintiff to obtain an injunction where he 
has only shown 'serious questions going to the merits' and a balance of hardships that tips sharply 
towards the plaintiff ... so long as the plaintiff also shows that there is a likelihood of irreparable injury 
and that the injunction is in the public interest.") (emphasis added) (footnore omitted) (citation omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); Am. Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Heritage Life Ins. Co., 494 F.2d 3, 12 
(5th Cir. 1974) ("The district court found that 'heritage' was 'a word whose primary meaning was so 
intimately associated with and descriptive of the services intended to be distinguished in commerce' that 
'strong evidence of secondary meaning' would be required before AHLIC could be permitted to appro­
priate it. We agree that the evidentiary burden necessary to establish secondary meaning is substantial 
where the proposed mark's original or primary meaning suggests the basic nature of the service to be 
rendered." (emphasis added)); En Verve, Inc. v. Unger Meat Co., 779 F. Supp. 2d 840, 844 (N.D. Ill. 
201 I) ("(U]nder the 'sliding scale' approach for granting injunctive relief, En Verve will need a very 
strong showing on the other factors to be entitled to a preliminary injunction." ( emphasis added)). 
154 Labor supply elasticity studies measure how changes to the pretax wages impact work deci­
sions. Marios Karabarbounis, Heterogeneity in Labor Supply Elasticity and Optimal Taxation 2-4 
(Soc 'y for Econ. Dynamics, Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Meeting Paper No. 655, 2012), available at 
http://www.economicdynamics.org/meetpapers/2012/paper _ 655.pdf (presenting a quantitative study). 
Tax elasticity studies similarly measure how higher taxes impact the work decision, focusing on after-
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fleets a greater willingness to substitute leisure for work as wages drop. 155
As shown below, a higher elasticity correlates with a higher reservation 
price, thereby justifying a greater recovery reduction. 156
Labor elasticity technically equals the employment percentage change 
divided by the wage percentage change. 157 For example, a 10 percent wage
drop would induce a 10 percent work reduction by a laborer with a labor 
elasticity of 1. 158 The diminishing marginal utility discussion above suggests
one key factor impacting an individual's elasticity: individual wealth. 159 All
else equal, the utility from monetary compensation generally decreases as 
wealth increases. 160 Unsurprisingly then, elasticity studies consistently asso­
ciate wealth with a higher labor elasticity. 161
To see this promising elasticity use, let's revisit Example l 162 with a
new focus on approximating reservation prices and surplus values for lndie 
and Igor. 
Example 3: Igor and Indie each agree to take on an extra project paying $10,000 for their 
services. Both already have commitments to also work on nine other equal projects. Igor and 
lndie each would have accepted the new project for less than $10,000, although the actual 
reservation price for each is now unknown. Indie is wealthier than Igor, which suggests that 
she has a higher elasticity than Igor, all else equal. As such, let's assume a higher 0.4 elastici-
tax wages. Jon Gruber & Emmanuel Saez, The Elasticity of Taxable Income: Evidence and Implications, 
84 J. PUB. EcoN. I, 2-3, 23-28 (2002); Joel Slemrod & Wojciech Kopczuk, The Optimal Elasticity of 
Taxable Income, 84 J. PUB. ECON. 91, 91-94 (2002). The labor elasticity term refers to both labor supply 
and tax elasticity studies. 
155 See RONALD G. EHRENBERG & ROBERTS. SMITH, MODERN LABOR ECONOMICS 76-77 (3d ed.
1988). I 56 As discussed previously, the correct recovery equals the lost surplus value, and the surplus
value equals the contract price less the reservation price. See supra Part I.A.2. 
157 As used herein, the elasticity formula measures the "hours elasticity," calibrating how wage rate
changes impact the hours worked by employed categories of people. See Robert McClelland & Shannon 
Mok, A Review of Recent Research on Labor Supply Elasticities 6 (Cong. Budget Office, Working 
Paper No. 2012-12, 2012) (hereinafter CBO Report], available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/ 
cbofiles/attachments/10-25-iW 12-Recent_ Research_ on_ Labor_ Supply_ Elasticities.pdf. In contrast, 
participation elasticity measures how wage rate changes impact the share of the population that works at 
all. Id.; see infra note 174. 
158 Calculated as 0.1/0.1 =I.In contrast, someone else with a lower elasticity of0.2 would drop 10
percent of their work only if wages were cut in half, calculated as 0.1/0.5 = 0.2. 
159 See supra Part I.B.2.
160 Greene & Baron, supra note 75, at 243-44.161 See, e.g., CBO Report, supra note 157, at 22. Retirement decision studies, which also analyze 
the decision whether to forego future work for leisure, further support the wealth factor. See. e.g., 
EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 155, at 240 ("Thus, we should expect wealthier people or people with 
more generous pension benefits as of age 60 to retire earlier, other things equal."); CORI E. UCCELLO, 
URBAN INST., FACTORS INFLUENCING RETIREMENT: THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR RAISING RETIREMENT 
AGE, at iv-v (1998), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/I000207_retire_factors.pdf (pre­
senting a similar analysis on wealth). 
162 See supra text accompanying note 6. 
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ty for Indie and a lower 0.2 elasticity for Igor. Again assume the counterparty breaches be­
fore either one begins perfonnance. 
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The elasticity data neatly converts into reservation prices and surplus 
values. Under the formula above, a 25 percent wage change would induce 
Indie to drop 10 percent of her work. 163 This converts into a $7,500 reserva­
tion price on the tenth job in question, 164 leaving a $2,500 surplus value. In
short, her surplus value simply equals the wage change percentage times the 
contract price. In comparison, Igor has a higher $5,000 surplus value given 
his 50 percent required wage change. 165 His higher surplus value makes 
sense given his relative inelasticity compared to Indie. 
The earlier discussion highlighted another key criterion possibly im­
pacting elasticity: the existing workload. 166 Busier contractors generally 
should have higher labor elasticities since each new project requires sacri­
fice of more limited (and valuable) leisure time. 167 While existing studies 
have not adequately addressed this issue, the overtime pay literature gener­
ally supports a direct correlation between labor elasticity and workload. 168 
Perhaps this Article will inspire an interested empiricist to model this aspect 
further with this potentially intriguing use now in mind. 169 Empirical studies 
163 0.4 = (0.1/X); X = 0.25 (i.e., 0.1/0.25= 0.4).
164 If a 25 percent wage drop would induce Indie to decrease her work by IO percent, this indicates
a reservation price on the tenth job (constituting 10 percent of her workload) of $7,500. For instance, she 
likely would take the job for $8,000 Gust a 20 percent drop), but not for $7,000 (a 30 percent drop). 
165 0.2 = (0.1/X); X = 0.5 required wage change. The surplus value equals the $ 10,000 contract
price times the 0.5 required wage change. 
166 See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
167 The diminishing marginal utility of leisure makes a static amount of lost leisure from each
contract increasingly more painful as workload increases since the lost leisure becomes more valuable as 
it dwindles. 
168 See, e.g., Bils, supra note 77, at 419 ("Even in industries not required to pay an overtime pre­
mium, the marginal disutility of work presumably increases with the level of hours. If finns must com­
pete for labor, compensation must reflect this higher disutility at higher hours."). Thus, finns will have 
to pay an overtime premium even though not required by law. DWAYNE BENJAMIN ET AL., LABOUR 
MARKET ECONOMICS 60---61 (5th ed. 200 2), available at http://highered.mcgraw-hill.com/sites/dl/ 
free/00708915 40/ 43 156/benjaminS_sample_chap0 2.pdf ("Because the worker is overemployed at the 
going wage rate, the overtime premium is necessary to get her to work more hours."); DANIEL S. 
HAMERMESH, LABOR DEMAND 5 4  (1993) ("[W]orkers' supply responses ... require that a higher wage 
rate must be paid to elicit additional weekly hours .... "); see also ROBERT A. HART, THE ECONOMICS 
OF OVERTIME WORKING 82 ( 200 4) ("[O]vertime pay may act to 'find' those workers willing to supply 
extra hours at given premium rates."); Anders Frederiksen et al., Overtime Work, Dual Job Holding and 
Taxation l (Inst. for Study of Labor, Discussion Paper No. 3 23, 2001), available at http:// 
ftp.iza.org/dp3 23.pdf ("The wages in overtime job [sic] typically exceed the wages in main occupation 
although empirical evidence show that this is not always the case, and sometimes there is even no com­
pensation for overtime work .... "). 
169 One current difficulty is that the elasticity studies can show varying results. See Michael P.
Keane, Labor Supply and Taxes: A Survey, 49 J. ECON. LITERATURE 961, 96 2 ( 2011) ("Indeed, the labor 
supply literature is characterized by a number of sharp controversies, many of which revolve around the 
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identify other elasticity factors although these are generally less applicable 
to the L VSP setting. 110 Guided by the empirical literature, courts could look 
to relevant variables like wealth, workload, and potentially other indicators 
to gauge the likelihood ofLVSP status and/or the innocent party's reserva­
tion wage. 
*** 
In sum, either balanced approach would significantly improve upon 
the current polar extremes of L VSP determination. The choice between the 
two is somewhat overstated given their potential overlap in practice. For 
instance, the elasticity analysis suggests important criteria-income and 
working hours-for use under the sliding scale likelihood approach. 171 By 
shifting contract damages closer to actual reservation wages, either or both 
approaches would more closely approximate a laborer's "benefit of the bar­
gain," thereby advancing both fairness and efficiency goals. 
magnitudes of labor supply elasticities, and the methods used to estimate them."). But given the extreme 
gaps in current law, the use of elasticity studies seems quite promising despite some imprecision. In 
addition, a technical question arises as to whether the overall elasticity number should be used or the 
higher substitution-only number. In this setting, the higher substitution-only number likely should be 
used similar to the following analysis for overtime work (since we are evaluating just the one extra 
contract in question). Cf BENJAMIN ET AL., supra note 168, at 60-61 ("The person works longer hours 
even though he is overemployed at the going wage rate because the overtime premium results in a large 
substitution effect, by making the price (opportunity cost, income forgone) of leisure higher only for the 
overtime hours. The overtime premium has a small income effect because the budget constraint rotates 
upward only for the overtime hours; consequently, it does not have an income effect for the normal 
straight-time hours."). 
170 Secondary marital earners with children tend to show a much higher elasticity. See CBO Re­
port, supra note 157, at 12-13 (explaining decrease in married women's elasticity over time as partially 
attributable to the decline in fertility rates); see also Klara Kali�kova, Family Taxation and the Female 
Labor Supply: Evidence from the Czech Republic 19-22 (CERGE-El Working Paper Series, Paper No. 
496, 2013) (showing that joint taxation led to a decline of about 3 percent in the employment rate of 
married women with children, with declines twice as large among women with high-income husbands). 
The studies also indicate that women tend to have more elasticity than men, while skilled workers tend 
to have less elasticity than unskilled workers. For a small sampling of the vast body of literature, see 
Keane, supra note 169, at 1045-46, 1071 (surveying the literature and noting the sharp contrast between 
the genders); Nezih Guner et al., Taxing Women: A Macroeconomic Analysis 2 (Inst. for Study of Labor, 
Discussion Paper No. 5962, 2011) ("(I]t is well known that the labor supply elasticities of women are 
larger than those of men .... "); Mauro Mastrogiacomo et al., A Structural Analysis of Labour Supply 
Elasticities in the Netherlands 3 (CPB Neth. Bureau for Econ. Policy Analysis, Discussion Paper No. 
235, 2013) ("Low skilled singles and single parents have much higher labour supply elasticities than 
their high skilled counterparts .... "). 
171 Note how the elasticity approach also utilizes a sliding scale adjustment, but now based on the
elasticity number rather than an LVSP likelihood determination. 
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B. Extension of Corrective Regime to Full-Time Employees
329 
As demonstrated in Part II, significant compensated leisure gaps re­
main in the full-time employee context even with mitigation from substitute 
work. 172 The prior L VSP demonstration suggests one possible improvement 
through a similar sliding scale approximation of surplus value. 173 While the
elasticity approach also intrigues, the sliding scale approach converts more 
readily to this full-time setting. 174 This Section presents a modified sliding
scale approach through an initial sketch of the idea, a follow-up illustrative 
example, and an explanatory discussion for further support. 
Recall that the compensated leisure flaw persists in the full-time em­
ployee context due to the employee's ability to reject noncomparable work 
172 See supra Part n.
173 Note that one commentator considered a somewhat similar approach, albeit seemingly only for
noncomparable work, thereby maintaining a firm dividing line between comparable and noncomparable 
work. See Harrison supra note 25, at 232-35. Professor Jeffery Harrison's proposal also differs from the 
proposal presented in this Article in that the percentage offset would (I) be based on the "effort" com­
ponent; and (2) remain the same regardless of whether the employee accepted the work. Id. at 234-35. 
Note though that extension of the proposal to employees is not necessary to support the changes to 
L VSPs, where the case is more compelling due to the lack of any mitigation offset. See infra Conclu­
sion. Implementation in both areas would require some coordination, especially if say a mere "unlikely" 
finding of non-L VSP status triggered a 70 percent reduction under the suggested rules. See supra Part 
III.A. This percentage reduction would make sense if the treatment of full-time employment was left
unchanged since the laborer otherwise would experience a 100 percent reduction under current law. As
such, the laborer would receive some appropriate relief for having a borderline LVSP case. But if the
Part lII.B proposal is implemented as well, leaving the laborer with a 70 percent reduction would be too
harsh if the laborer's new work was "highly noncomparable." In this case, as discussed in greater detail
below, the laborer would experience only a slight 10 percent reduction apart from any LVSP claim. As 
such, the percentage reduction should drop to at least 10 percent since a borderline LVSP claim should
only help, not hurt, the laborer. Another option would be to further credit the laborer for their L VSP
argument by multiplying the Part III.A and III.B percentages to arrive at the ultimate reduction (e.g.,
only a 7 percent reduction on the assumed facts above. 70% x l0% = 7%).
174 The full-time employment context complicates an elasticity application as follows. Recall how
Part !fl.A converted the "hours elasticity" into a surplus value multiplier by focusing on the percentage 
work reduction for a laborer. See supra note 157 and accompanying text. This "hours elasticity" notion 
does not really apply when considering the reservation price for a contract constituting all of the labor­
er's work time. Such full-time contracts then seem to implicate instead the laborer's "participation 
elasticity," which measures how wage rate changes impact the share of the population that works at all. 
See CBO Report, supra note 157, at 6. But this "participation elasticity" does not then translate so easily 
into a multiplier adjustment. The elasticity studies also might be less helpful here since the "income" 
effects seem more dominant, which lessens the substitution effect. This results since the price change 
impacts the laborer's entire work effort. See supra note 168 and accompanying text, for a discussion of 
income versus substitution effects. Finally, note how one of the two key elasticity factors-number of 
hours otherwise worked-now falls out of the calculus for these full-time contracts. With that in mind, 
perhaps wealth is one elasticity factor that might be taken into account in adjusting the percentage 
recovery for comparability (e.g., perhaps a greater willingness to apply a highly comparable multiplier 
to a wealthier laborer). 
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without triggering a mitigation offset. 175 Rejection of noncomparable work
thus gives the employee both his/her surplus value and liberated leisure 
time. On the other hand, rejected comparable work can wipe out any recov­
ery under the mitigation offset. This inflexible "all-or-nothing" dichotomy 
conflicts with the uncertainty and gradation surrounding such a finding. 
As with L VSP status, a sliding scale approach-now based on work 
comparability-can mitigate the current rigid determination and better align 
recoveries with actual surplus values. To demonstrate, first assume that the 
employee declines the new work. Under a sliding scale approach, the re­
covery would drop by a percentage of the newly available wages. The per­
centage reduction would increase on a sliding scale as the new work be­
comes more comparable. 176 The offset could be 90 to 95 percent of the wag­
es for a "highly comparable" job in the Palagi ballpark, 177 declining down 
to 10 percent at the other extreme for a "highly noncomparable" job like a 
waiter position for a discharged secretary. 178 Intermediary percentages
would apply to loosely comparable or noncomparable jobs. 179 If the dis­
charged employee accepted the new job, the percentage reduction would 
then slightly increase without eliminating the recovery. 180 
To illustrate the benefits of such a flexible regime, take the following 
example: 
Example 4: Eddie, Ellen, Esther, and Evan all have full-time employment contracts which 
pay $100,000 for the upcoming year. All four employers breach on the contracts. Eddie and 
Ellen each have only a highly noncomparable option available to them, which pays $100,000 
175 See supra Part II.A.
176 Thus, somewhat similar to current practice, the fact finder would make the categorical finding
of (non)comparable or highly (non)comparable. This approach could also include in an extremely 
(non)comparable category if desired. An alternative ranking approach would simply require a determi­
nation of comparability on a scale of say one to ten. 
177 Palagi v. Nationwide Mui. Ins. Co., 69 F. Supp. 2d 903, 904-05, 907 (S.D. Tex. 1999). Again,
while Palagi dealt with the identical job (other than the change in boss), it more broadly represents cases 
where the new work provides a very close match on geographical location, pay, title, and responsibili­
ties. Note that it might then seem like a I 00 percent reduction is appropriate here regardless of whether 
the employee takes on the work, but some recovery could be justified in the sense that nothing is truly 
exactly the same, and that the employee deserves a little something for the trouble. 
178 
Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY§ 455 cmt. d, illus. 2 (1958) (noting that a discharged 
secretary would face mitigation after some time for an available typist job, but not a waiter job). 
179 See id. § 455 cmt. d, illus. I, for a potential loosely comparable scenario, with the focus now on
the secretarial and typist jobs. While perhaps somewhat outdated, this example still nicely captures the 
essence. A more modern example might contrast the position of an executive assistant to that of an 
office manager, receptionist, etc. See, e.g., What ls an Executive Assistant?, DEGREEDIRECTORY.ORG, 
http://degreedirectory.org/articles/What_is_ an_ Executive_ Assistant.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2014) 
("Executive assistants hold more responsibilities and typically rank higher than the following other 
clerical professionals: Receptionists[;] Clerks[;] Secretaries[;] Administrative assistants; Administrative 
associates[; and] Office managers."). 
180 For instance, the reduction could increase to 25 percent for a highly noncomparable job. The
percentages provide flexibility and could be adjusted as deemed appropriate. 
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for the year. Esther has a loosely comparable option available to her while Evan has a highly 
comparable option available to him, both of which also pay $100,000 for the year. Eddie, Es­
ther, and Evan all decline the work, while Ellen accepts the work. 
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Let's first examine the results based on current law. Under current law, 
Eddie receives the full $100,000 since he declines "noncomparable" work. 
Esther likely also receives the full $100,000 since she declines only loosely 
comparable work. In contrast, Ellen and Evan both likely receive nothing 
by either taking on new work (Ellen) or turning down highly comparable 
work (Evan). These results are charted below: 
New Work Accept or Current Proposed 
Decline? Recovery Recovery 
Eddie Highly Noncomparable Decline $100,000 $90,000 
Ellen Highly Noncomparable Accept Nothing .$75,000 
Esther Loosely Comparable Decline $100,000 $50,000 
C 
Evan Highly Comparable Decline Nothing $10,000 
This comparison highlights the sliding scale proposal's moderation be­
tween current law's disturbing "all-or-nothing" extremes. As noted above, 
Eddie and Esther receive the full contract price under current law, while 
Ellen and Evan receive nothing. Current law thus makes an absolute "all-or­
nothing" determination despite the reality of varying degrees on a spectrum 
of comparability. 181 In favorable contrast, the proposed regime would pro­
vide a more nuanced partial recovery for all, ranging from $10,000 to 
$90,000. As detailed below, the proposal's moderating approach advances 
the fairness and efficiency goals of contract law. 
181 See, e.g., Parker v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 474 P.2d 689, 694 (Cal. 1970) ("[A]
dramatic actress in a western style motion picture can by no stretch of imagination be considered the 
equivalent of or substantially similar to the lead in a song-and-dance production." (emphasis added)). 
Comparable employment under Title VII must have "virtually identical promotional opportunities, 
compensation, job responsibilities, working conditions, and status .... " Sellers v. Delgado Cmty. Coll., 
839 F.2d 1132, 1138 (5th Cir. 1988). Private contracts often predefine "comparable employment" but 
the results still vary from exclusively focusing on compensation to exclusively focusing on field of 
expertise, even within the same field of employment. See, e.g., Martin J. Greenberg & Djenane Paul, 
Coaches' Contracts: Terminating a Coach Without Cause and the Obligation to Mitigate Damages. 23 
MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 339, 373-76 (2013). 
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First compare the three employees who declined work after the breach. 
Eddie and Esther each receive the full contract price under current law, 
consistent with a zero reservation price and a full $100,000 surplus value. 
Evan receives nothing, consistent with a full $100,000 reservation price and 
no surplus value. But are these situations really so extreme? 
Focus first on Evan's more readily justified outcome. Evan's rejection 
demonstrates zero surplus value for the new work. 182 Arguably, this also 
shows little or no surplus value on the breached contract due to the jobs' 
comparability. But this only follows where the two jobs are extremely close 
substitutes, as in Palagi. 183 As the job differences expand, the rejection's 
indication of a de minimis surplus value on the breached contract lessens. 
With that in mind, why not substitute a more flexible percentage adjustment 
in lieu of the current 0 or 100 percent extremes? After all, Evan did decide 
to accept the first contract but reject the second, perhaps evidencing differ­
ent surplus values for the two jobs. 
More compellingly, Esther's rejection of even loosely comparable 
work indicates a surplus value on the breached contract meaningfully below 
$100,000. 184 A moderate 50 percent reduction is justified in lieu of current 
law's full recovery which implicitly assumes a zero reservation price. 185 
Eddie's highly noncomparable opportunity is more ambiguous since 
the low surplus value indication wanes as the differences between jobs 
mount. Nonetheless, some smaller reduction is appropriate as his decision 
to stay idle evidences a taste for leisure over work and a surplus value be­
low the contract price. 186 Current law fails to capture any of these aspects. 
182 Note the importance of the point that for comparable work, Evan keeps everything he earns due 
to mitigation on the contract regardless. Compare this to the incentives problem for noncomparables. 
See infra notes 187-189 and accompanying text. In this regard, the rejection does not provide absolute 
proof of zero surplus value since Evan might falsely believe that he will lose his wages on the breached 
contract only if he accepts the new opportunity, or perhaps it is not so clear after all that the two jobs are 
truly comparable. 
183 Palagi v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 69 F. Supp. 2d 903,907 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
184 Note that such rejection under current Jaw does not provide a useful indicator of surplus value 
on the breached contract because mitigation operates like a I 00 percent tax on the proceeds for 
noncomparable work. See infra Part III.B.2. But this proposal would allow retention of some recovery 
from accepting even noncomparable work, thereby providing a useful indicator of surplus value. Fur­
thermore, the rejection under current law does not then support the full recovery on the breached con­
tract as this essentially equates to a finding that the surplus value equals the contract price. Rather, the 
rejection just continues to leave courts in the dark as to true reservation prices. 
185 This equates to an implausible assumption that Esther would have accepted the first job for free. 
See supra Part Il.B. But that seems even more implausible given Esther's decision to stay idle in the 
face of other work opportunities. 
186 Further recall how the lack of any offset under current law essentially places a zero value on 
Eddie's liberated leisure time. See supra Part II.A. In this regard, some even-smaller reduction could be 
justified even absent any available work. Any such adjustment should be relatively slight, though, since 
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With its more flexible outcomes, the sliding scale approach minimizes 
the pressure on reaching the "correct" comparability finding. Also, the slid­
ing scale approach intuitively appeals apart from the technical surplus value 
analysis above. Increasing the recovery as the alternative work becomes 
less comparable makes sense since the rejection becomes more understand­
able. In the words of the Palagi court, one can start to see "the damages" as 
the new work deviations expand. 
2. Highly Noncomparable Comparison
As discussed in Part II, current law disincentives productive activity 
by providing compensated leisure to employees only if they remain idle. 187 
To illustrate this incentives problem, focus on the two employees with high­
ly noncomparable opportunities, Eddie and Ellen. Under current law, Eddie, 
who rejects the new work, receives the full $100,000, while Ellen receives 
nothing on the breached contract due to her new earnings. As each receives 
the same $100,000 total, Ellen's breaching employer captures all the cash 
benefits from Ellen's work sacrifice. 188 This incentivizes Ellen to reject the 
work like Eddie. 189 
Focusing solely on the incentives perspective, Ellen should receive the 
same contract recovery as Eddie so that she receives the full monetary ben­
efit from her work sacrifice. However, the benefit of the bargain norm sup­
ports a lower recovery. Ellen's lost benefit equals just any excess surplus 
value on the breached contract over the new work. 190 In sum, the incentives 
the lack of any rejection fails to provide any useful indicator regarding surplus value. In addition, if 
there really are no other opportunities due to tough economic times, it seems that reservation prices 
generally should drop, thereby increasing surplus values. In any event, this category of cases without 
any newly available work should be relatively small given the broad category of highly noncomparable 
work. 
187 See supra Part Il.A.
188 The $100,000 of new earnings maintains Ellen's $100,000 income, eliminating her employer's
$100,000 liability. 
189 There might be some long-term benefits which could induce her to take the job in certain cir­
cumstances. See Evans, supra note 25, at 11-14. 
190 Ellen is not properly entitled to the surplus value on both contracts since she cannot handle both
full-time jobs simultaneously. If the surplus value on the new "inferior" work is lower than on the origi­
nal work, she is entitled to such difference. In one sense, Ellen's acceptance of the new "inferior" job 
arguably supports a higher recovery on the breached contract since such acceptance might indicate a 
particular preference for work over leisure and therefore a lower reservation price. But again, Ellen is 
entitled to only one full surplus value due to her inability to handle both jobs. In the other direction, her 
acceptance of the noncomparable work arguably suggests that the difference in her surplus values be­
tween the two jobs is not so great, thereby supporting a greater reduction to her recovery. It is possible, 
though, that the new work's surplus value is much lower, albeit still positive enough to induce her 
acceptance. In any event, the "correct" reduction from a benefits perspective needs to be balanced 
against the incentives concern. 
334 GEO. MASON L. REV. [VOL. 22:2 
and fairness goals diverge when contemplating the ideal recovery for new 
work.191 
The proposed regime strikes an appropriate balance between these 
competing goals. 192 Under the proposal, Ellen retains some, but not all, of
the new earnings. Under the suggested percentages above, Ellen would net 
an additional $85,000 by accepting the new work, equal to 85 percent of the 
new earnings.193 This moderating compromise would significantly decrease
current law's extreme incentives distortion while also maintaining contact 
with contract law's fairness criteria.194
CONCLUSION 
The benefit of the bargain benchmark encourages efficient breaches 
while providing fair results to both sides on such breach. Damages above 
this norm unduly punish the breaching party and can deter efficient breach­
es. Unfortunately, current law inadvertently provides such undesirable ex­
cess compensation by ignoring the saved work effort on breached service 
contracts. 
Both theoretic and practical reasons explain why current law contains 
this significant flaw. Legal theory's neglect of the labor/leisure tradeoff 
explains the general lack of commentary on this contract damage law prob­
lem. The lack of an obvious remedy provides a further practical impedi­
ment. 
Mindful of these impediments, this Article focused initially on the 
more pristine L VSP setting. Without the possibility of mitigation or other 
offsets, the LVSP setting more readily exposes the current law's anomalies 
and potential practical solutions. As shown, courts can mitigate the com-
191 Note that these concepts also apply to new work other than highly noncomparable opportuni­
ties. This Section focused on the highly noncomparable scenario since that was the one category in 
Example 4 that had one employee accept and another reject the new work. 
192 More generally this reflects the typical tension between providing both a fair and efficient
result. This neatly links to the tax elasticity studies, which highlight the tradeoff between potentially 
desirable fairness gains from higher rates versus the resulting efficiency loss to the extent such higher 
rates distort decision making. See generally ARTHUR M. OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG 
TRAD EOFF 88-92, 101-08 (197 5) (discussing the classic fairness/efficiency balance in the tax law). 
193 As shown in the chart above, Ellen would receive $75,000 on the breached contract if she
accepts. This would give her $175,000 total ($75,000 on the breached contract, and $100,000 paid on 
the new contract). In contrast, if Ellen declines, she gets $90,000 total (all from the breached contract). 
$175,000 total less $90,000 equals an additional $85,000 by accepting the new work. An alternative 
pathway to the $85,000 figure is the following: By taking the new work, she loses $15,000 from the 
breached contract ($90,000 - $75,000). And since she gets paid $100,000 from the new work, that re­
sults in an $85,000 benefit. 
194 Contra Harrison, supra note 25, at 232-35 (stating the common law's "all-or-nothing" rule and
proposing a regime whereby the discharged employee could keep 100 percent of the new earnings). 
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pensated leisure flaw through use of existing elasticity data, 195 and/or more 
detailed findings of L VSP status. 
Although the compensated leisure flaw lessens for full-time employ­
ees, current law's mitigation approach in this area also could be significant­
ly improved. 196 Having already blazed the sliding scale trail to reform for 
L VSPs, the ready reform for full-time employees easily follows: vary the 
employee's percentage recovery reduction based on the new job's degree of 
comparability. 197 This sliding scale would provide a more balanced result 
than the current law's problematic "all-or-nothing" approach. 198 
In sum, contracting parties, like the homeowners in the Introduction, 
deserve comparable treatment regardless of whether they enter into con­
tracts for services or goods. Breaching parties on goods contracts can cut 
their losses without additional penalty by paying only the innocent party's 
benefit of the bargain. By ignoring the laborer's performance efforts, how­
ever, current law inconsistently provides a windfall to laborers on service 
contracts at the service recipients' extra expense. Fortunately, the feasible 
reforms demonstrated above can rectify this unfortunate disconnect. 199 In 
195 This results since the LVSP context focuses on the relinquishment of just one project out of
many, rather than relinquishment of the laborer's entire work effort. See supra Part III.A. Somewhat 
related, now that this Article has uncovered this exciting potential elasticity use, perhaps an interested 
empiricist will be inspired to model elasticity with this particular use in mind. More detailed modeling 
would make elasticity figures even more useful over time. 
196 Despite this strong case for employees too, the proposed reform could be implemented solely in
the more defective L VSP area. Especially given the status quo bias favoring incremental reform, the 
initial reform could cover just L VSPs, with a possible later extension to full-time employees. The status 
quo bias cautions against making substantial changes all at once, favoring instead a more incremental 
approach. See, e.g., William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, I 
J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 33-35, 37-39 (1988). On the other hand, changing both areas together would
improve the coordination between the two, thereby further reducing the pressure on the L VSP determi­
nation. Even without the employee change, though, the proposal would improve the coordination given
the current complete insulation from any mitigation offset under an L VSP finding.
197 With the shifted focus to comparability degree, the more balanced result would again corre­
spond to an appropriate surplus value indicator. 
198 For an article critiquing another aspect of contract law-the damage calculation for uncertain
profits-due to its troubling all-or-nothing results, see Elmer J. Schaefer, Uncertainty and the Law of 
Damages, 19 WM. & MARYL. REV. 719, 740 (1978) (''This all-or-nothing characteristic has led a num­
ber of commentators to criticize the rule. The approach proposed in this Article provides an appealing 
alternative which avoids this all-or-nothing characteristic, permitting a compromise between these 
extremes, and limits damages in a precise and appropriate way." (footnote omitted)). 
199 Note that current law has its own practical difficulties in determining the amount of saved cash
costs. See, e.g., supra Part LC.I (discussing whether the contractor would have saved cash by subcon­
tracting out the work). Beyond the subcontracting issue, much litigation concerns the extent of saved 
monetary expenditures from contract breaches. Consider, for instance, the troubling area of proper 
adjustment for an allocable portion of "overhead" expenses. See, e.g., 3 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, 
FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 12.10, at 219-20 & nn.23-24 (3d ed. 2010); see also Patterson, supra 
note 43, at 1293-96. 
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the immortal words of contracts luminary Karl Llewellyn
200 regarding the 
attractive flexibility of the common law, "the rule follows where its reason 
leads; where the reason stops, there stops the rule. "201 
200 Llewellyn was the driving force behind the Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C."). Gregory E.
Maggs, Karl Llewellyn 's Fading Imprint on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 71 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 541, 541-44 (2000). Article 2 of the U.C.C. governs the sale of goods. While the U.C.C. 
does not govern service contracts, courts often look to the U .C.C. for guidance on service contracts 
given its reputation for a well-reasoned approach. See, e.g., Vitex Mfg. Corp. v. Caribtex Corp., 377 
F.2d 795, 799 (3d Cir. 1967) ("While this contract is not controlled by the Code, the Code is persuasive
here because it embodies the foremost modern legal thought concerning commercial transactions.").20I K.N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 189 (1981); see also 
Scott R. Grubman, Bark with No Bite: How the Inevitable Discovery Rule is Undermining the Supreme 
Court's Decision in Arizona v. Gant, 101 J. CRIM. L. &CRIMINOLOGY I 19, I 19 (201 I) ("Apart from the 
poetic and literary value of this quotation, Professor Llewellyn's point is quite simple and abundantly 
relevant in all areas of the law: when a rule is created for certain reasons, and those reasons cease to 
exist, the rule should no longer be applied. Courts have utilized Professor Llewellyn's axiom in various 
areas of the law, refusing to apply rules to situations in which the reasons justifying the rules are no 
longer present."). 
